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 Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa – Part 2: A Critique of 
Some Priority OECD Actions from an African Perspective  
 
Annet Wanyana Oguttu 
 
 
Summary 
 
In Part 2 of this article, the author continues her examination of the implications of the 
OECD’s Action Plan on Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting from an African perspective. 
Although the OECD Project covers 15 Actions to address BEPS, the low economic 
development of many African countries, their limited administrative capacity and general lack 
of development of international tax laws limits the ability of these countries to fully implement 
all the OECD’s recommendations to curtail BEPS. This paper identifies three of the highest 
priority actions that have the greatest BEPS impact for African economies. These are: Action 
4, which deals with limiting base erosion via interest deductions and other financial 
payments; Action 6, which deals with preventing treaty abuse; and Action 7, which deals with 
preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status. Referring to examples 
from an array of African countries, the paper discusses the special concerns that these 
countries face with respect to Actions 4, 6 and 7 and the limitations of the measures that they 
currently apply to deal with those concerns. Thereafter, the paper provides recommendations 
as to how African countries can effectively implement the OECD recommendations with 
respect to Actions 4, 6 and 7. This analysis is based on the premise that as much as African 
countries are encouraged to associate themselves with the OECD recommendations to 
curtail BEPS, their approach should be one of coming up with customised solutions to protect 
their tax bases. Since African countries’ tax systems are not homogenous and since their 
levels of economic development as well as their levels of administrative capacity to deal with 
the challenges associated with BEPS vary immensely, each country must evaluate its own 
situation to identify its particular issues and determine the most appropriate techniques to 
ensure a sound tax base.   
 
Keywords: Base erasing interest deductions; treaty shopping; treaty abuse; permanent 
establishment; base erosion and profit shifting; limitation of benefits; principle purpose test; 
beneficial ownership; thin capitalisation 
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Introduction  
 
In Part 1 (Oguttu 2016) of this two-part paper on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS)1 in 
Africa, the author dealt with the question: ‘What should Africa’s response be to the OECD 
BEPS Action Plan?’ In answering this question, the paper described what BEPS is, its 
causes and impact, and how African countries should response to the OECD BEPS project. 
The paper pointed out that although the OECD Project covers 15 Actions (OECD 2013a: 5) 
to address BEPS, the G20 Development Working Group on Domestic Resource Mobilisation 
for Developing Countries indicated that due to the specific challenges faced by developing 
countries, the highest priority actions that have the greatest impact for developing economies 
are (G20 2014):  
 
- Action 4: Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments 
- Action 6: Prevent treaty abuse 
- Action 7: Prevent the artificial avoidance of PE [permanent establishment] status 
- Action 10: Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation with 
respect to other high-risk transactions 
- Action 11: Establish methodologies to collect and analyse data on BEPS and the 
actions to address it 
- Action 13: Re-examine transfer pricing documentation. 
 
The above are largely consistent with those identified by the United Nations (UN) 
Subcommittee on BEPS from the responses to its questionnaire about the priority BEPS 
concerns of developing countries (UN Committee of Experts 2014; UN 2015a: viii). It should 
be noted that the above Actions may not necessarily be of top priority in all African countries 
since they are at different levels of economic development and administrative capacity. Due 
to the broad nature of issues pertaining to each of these Actions, they cannot all be 
canvassed in an in-depth manner in an article with page limitations. This paper only deals 
with the first three of the priority actions from an African perspective (Actions 4, 6 and 7). 
This choice is informed by the Zambia’s Tax Administration’s response to the UN 
questionnaire on BEPS (the only African Tax Administration that responded to this 
questionnaire by the 2 May 2014 deadline).2 In response to the question: ‘If you are affected 
by base erosion and profit shifting, what are the most common practices or structures used in 
your country or region?’ Zambia’s Tax Administration3 responded:  
 
‘The most common practices and structures include: 
- tax treaty abuse especially through treaty shopping; 
- profit shifting through high interest, royalty, management and consultancy fee 
deductions; 
- the avoidance of permanent establishment creation by tailoring activities and contracts 
in such a way that the activities cannot be deemed/create a permanent establishment.’ 
 
These practices were also among those listed by the Economic Justice Network and Oxfam 
South Africa, a civil society organisation based in South Africa, which is the only other 
African entity that responded to the UN questionnaire.4 Although BEPS issues pertaining to 
                                                          
1  BEPS refers to ‘tax avoidance’ by multinational enterprises (MNEs) that use gaps in the interaction between different tax 
systems to reduce taxable income artificially, or shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions in which little or no economic activity 
is performed. See OECD 2013a: 5. 
2  United Nations ‘Questionnaire: Base erosion and profit shifting issues for developing countries’, 2013, 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/Beps/BepsIssues.pdf (accessed 25 November 2016). 
3  UN ‘Zambia’s Tax Administration response to the BEPS questionnaire regarding country experiences with base erosion 
and profit shifting issues’, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/Beps/CommentsZambia_BEPS.pdf (accessed 25 November 
2016). 
4 Economic Justice Network and Oxfam South Africa, ‘Countries' experience regarding base erosion and profit shifting 
issues – South Africa’, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/Beps/CommentsEJNandOxfamSA_BEPS.pdf (accessed 25 
November 2016). 
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transfer pricing are also of priority to African countries, due to page limitations, they are not 
covered in this paper.  
 
In addressing the above mentioned action items, it is important to keep in mind that the 
package of measures to address BEPS (agreed upon by all OECD countries and OECD 
Associate countries – eight G20 countries which are non-OECD countries5) are designed to 
be implemented domestically and through treaty provisions, supported by targeted 
monitoring and strengthened transparency (OECD 2015a: para. 6). Since addressing BEPS 
is critical for all countries, the OECD consulted with developing countries and other non-
OECD/non-G20 economies and their input was fed into the work (OECD 2014c: 3) to ensure 
a comprehensive approach which is globally supported. The OECD notes that international 
collaboration and co-ordination will not only facilitate and reinforce domestic actions to 
protect tax bases, but it is also key to providing comprehensive international solutions that 
may satisfactorily respond to the issues (OECD 2013a: 8). Thus African countries are 
encouraged to associate themselves with the OECD recommendations to curtail BEPS. The 
OECD’s recommendations on implementing the BEPS measures fall under four main 
categories, which are set out below. The categories under which the priority action items 
discussed in this report fall are pointed out.    
 
- The first category is the ‘minimum standards’ that were agreed upon to tackle BEPS 
issues, where no action by some countries would create negative spillovers on other 
countries. Action 6, which deals with treaty abuse, falls under this category (OECD 
2015a: para. 11).6 
- The second category is the ‘best practices and common approaches’ which countries 
agreed on to address BEPS concerns, especially in a domestic context. These will 
facilitate convergence of national practices and in future could become minimum 
standards. Action 4, which deals with limiting base eroding interest expenses, falls 
under this category (OECD 2015a: para. 18).7 
- The third category is ‘guidelines to reinforce international tax standards’ that countries 
agreed on. Action 7, which deals with curtailing artificial avoidance of permanent 
establishment status, falls under this category (OECD 2015a: para. 16).8 
- The fourth category is ‘analytical reports’ under which fall: Action 1, dealing with the 
tax challenges of the digital economy; Action 11, on methodologies to collect and 
analyse data on BEPS; and Action 15, which deals with developing a multilateral 
instrument. Work on these analytical reports is still ongoing.  
  
What follows below is a critical analysis of Africa’s concerns with respect to Actions 4, 6 and 
7 as well as recommendations as to how African countries can effectively implement the 
OECD recommendations in light of their economic development and tax administrative 
capacity constraints, as they endeavour to prevent BEPS. This analysis is premised on the 
view that Africa must come up with customised solutions to protect its own tax base. This is 
affirmed by the Cross Border Taxation Technical Committee (CBTTC) created by the African 
Tax Administration Forum (ATAF)9 in 2014 to define the African position on BEPS, to 
communicate the African response to the OECD/G20 BEPS project, and to present an 
African perspective on global tax matters. ATAF’s CBTTC calls for a customised approach to 
addressing BEPS that will assist African countries and groups of countries in similar positions 
                                                          
5 OECD/G20 ‘BEPS Project: Information Brief – 2014 Deliverables’, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2014-deliverables-
information-brief.pdf (accessed 25 November 2016)  
6 Other minimum standards cover: country-by-country reporting in Action 13; fighting harmful tax practices in Action 5; 
and improving dispute resolution in Action 14.   
7 Other best practices are: neutralise hybrid mismatches – Action 2; building blocks of effective Controlled Foreign 
Company rules – Action 3; and mandatory disclosure by taxpayers of aggressive tax avoidance – Action 12. 
8  Other best international tax standards cover Action 8-10 on transfer pricing, which has resulted in the revision of OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines as well as aspects of Action 2 dealing with dual resident entities, which, along with Action 7 
on PEs, will culminate in revisions of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
9  ATAF is an organisation that promotes and facilitates mutual cooperation among African tax administrators. For details 
on ATAF and its member countries visit http://www.ataftax.org/en/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 25 November 2016). 
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to ensure domestic resource mobilisation (ATAF 2014). The UN has also stressed that 
efforts in international tax cooperation ‘should fully take into account the different needs and 
capacities of all countries, in particular least developed countries, landlocked developing 
countries, small island developing States and African countries’ (UN 2015b: para. 28). The 
following Africa-customised analysis of BEPS Actions 4, 6 and 7 identifies the general 
concerns most African countries face and provides examples on specific matters from an 
array of African countries. It does not cover a detailed analysis of the issues in a specific 
African country.  
 
 
1  Action 4: Limit base erosion via interest 
deductions  
 
If a multinational enterprise (MNE) wants to finance its subsidiary companies in a group, it 
may do so by using loan capital, equity capital (Sommerhalder 1996: 80) or a combination of 
debt and equity capital (Lawrence 1990). Internationally, the tax treatment of a company and 
its finances differs fundamentally depending on whether it is financed by loan or equity 
capital (Sommerhalder 1996: 82). If capital is loaned by a parent company to its subsidiary, 
the latter will have to pay interest, which in most jurisdictions is a deductible expense in 
computing its taxable income (unless there are special rules to the contrary) (Oguttu 2013; 
Huxham and Haupt 2015: 80). If the parent company were to subscribe for shares in its 
subsidiary, dividends would have to be distributed by the subsidiary to the parent company. 
In most jurisdictions, dividends are not deductible when computing taxable income, since 
these are distributions of profits that have to be taxed (Sommerhalder 1996: 82). Clearly, 
financing a company with debt, at a deductible interest rate, is more effective in reducing 
source country tax than it is with equity financing, where dividends distributions are not 
deductible (Arnold and McIntyre 2002: 72-73; Olivier and Honiball 2011: 649). Indeed debt 
financing has long been recognised as a strong tax planning tool for MNEs which often come 
up with ‘thin capitalisation’ schemes to ensure that their subsidiary companies are financed 
with more debt than equity capital (Richardson, Hanlon and Nethercott 1998: 36). Although 
the availability of debt is essential for business growth, the potential for excessive interest 
deductions can erode countries’ tax bases. Where debt is granted among related entities, 
and one is located outside the country of the interest payer, the interest payments can be a 
major risk for base erosion. Debt can be loaded into companies operating in high-tax 
countries and arrangements made for deductible interest payments to be received by an 
entity in a low-tax jurisdiction, where it may be taxed favourably or not at all (UN 2015a: 11). 
The OECD notes that ‘the use of third party and related party interest is perhaps one of the 
most simple of the profit-shifting techniques available in international tax planning’ (OECD 
2015b: para. 1). This is because the fluidity and exchangeable nature of money makes it 
easy to adjust the mix of debt and equity capital in a controlled entity (OECD 2015b: para. 1). 
The BEPS risks that may arise with respect to excessive interest deductions often arise in 
three basic scenarios: firstly, subsidiary companies may be heavily debt financed, bearing a 
disproportionate share of the group’s total third party interest cost and incurring interest 
deductions which are used to shelter local profits from tax (OECD 2015b: p.16). Secondly, 
parent companies can claim relief for their interest expenses, while the return on equity 
holdings is taxed on a preferential basis; for example if it qualifies for a participation 
exemption10 or a preferential tax rate (OECD 2015b: p.15). Thirdly, BEPS could also result 
through the use of interest deductions to fund income which is exempt or deferred for tax 
purposes, and obtaining relief for interest deductions greater than the actual net interest 
                                                          
10  A participation exemption can be defined as a tax regime under which dividends received from foreign companies by 
resident companies are exempt from resident country tax if the resident company owns at least some percentage of the 
shares of the foreign company. See Arnold and McIntyre 2002: 165. 
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expense of the group (OECD 2015b: p.16). These three scenarios can be employed in 
various strategies; for example, by using intragroup loans to generate deductible interest 
expense in high tax jurisdictions and taxable interest income in low tax jurisdictions. Another 
strategy is by developing hybrid instruments which can give rise to deductible interest 
expense but no corresponding taxable income.11 Another strategy is by using dual resident 
hybrid entities to claim double interest deduction in both jurisdictions.12  
 
From a policy perspective, failure to tackle excessive interest payments to associated 
enterprises gives MNEs an advantage over domestic businesses that are unable to gain 
such tax advantages (OECD 2012: 7). Research shows that debt shifting is a major BEPS 
risk for developing countries and that they are more prone to these risks than developed 
countries (Fuest, Hebous and Riedel 2011: 12). The IMF affirms that debt shifting through 
intragroup loans is a common method of profit shifting that is of significant concern in many 
developing countries (IMF 2014: 30) which often lack effective provisions to guard against 
the use of borrowing to shift profits to lower tax jurisdictions (IMF 2014: 24). ATAF asserts 
that cross-border interest and similar financial flows to tax havens have a long track record in 
Africa as a BEPS risk.13 Many African countries are concerned about the high levels of 
interest deductions from their fiscus by domestic subsidiaries that are funded by foreign 
parent companies.14 Although countries may have general anti-avoidance provisions and 
judicial doctrines that may be applied to prevent the ensuring tax avoidance, the 
sophisticated interest deduction schemes that MNEs engage in often necessitate that 
countries enact more targeted provisions as discussed below.  
 
1.1 Measures applied by countries to curb excessive interest deductions 
 
The tax laws of countries cannot forbid enterprises from having excessive levels of debt but 
they can place limits on the amount of interest that is deductible. There are various measures 
that countries apply to curb excessive interest deductions (OECD 2015b: para. 6).  
 
(a) The arm’s length approach: Under this approach, the arm’s length principle15 (which 
is applied in curbing transfer pricing16) is used to determine whether the size of the loan 
would have been made in an arm’s length transaction17 or whether the rate of the interest is 
an arm’s length rate (OECD 1987: para. 48). Thus, if the loan exceeds what would have 
been lent in an arm’s length situation, then the lender must be taken to have an interest in 
the profitability of the enterprise and so the loan, or interest rate that exceeds the arm’s 
length amount, is considered as designed to procure a share in the profits (OECD 2015b: 
p.12). Thus, a prima facie loan can be regarded as some other kind of payment; for example, 
                                                          
11  A hybrid instrument can be defined as a financial instrument which may be treated as debt in one country and yet be 
regarded as equity in another country. Hybrid instruments can be used to achieve double non-taxation by, for instance, 
creating two interest deductions for one borrowing; generating deductions without corresponding income inclusions; or 
misusing foreign tax credit and participation exemption regimes. See Oguttu 2012. 
12  A hybrid entity is a legal relationship that is treated as a corporation in one jurisdiction and as a transparent (non-
taxable) entity in another. Where a hybrid entity is dual resident, in that it is treated as a taxable entity in two jurisdictions 
(for example if it is incorporated in one jurisdiction and has its place of effective management in another), such an entity 
can be able to claim double interest deduction in both jurisdictions. See Arnold and Mclntyre 2002: 144; Olivier and 
Honiball 2011: 554; Oguttu 2009a: 51-73.   
13  ATAF Second Meeting: Cross Border Taxation Technical Committee, 3-4 March 2015: 1; ATAF Workshop on 
Aggressive Tax Planning, 19-21 April 2016, Abuja, Nigeria, http://www.ataftax.org/en/Conferences/Pages/atp.aspx 
(accessed 16 December 2016) 
14  ATAF Second Meeting: Cross Border Taxation Technical Committee (3-4 March 2015). 
15  The arm’s length principle as set out in Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD MTC) provides that 
when conditions are made or imposed between two associated enterprises in their commercial or financial relations, 
which differ from those which would have been made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, 
but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so 
accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. 
16  ‘Transfer pricing’ is a term that describes the process by which related entities set prices at which they transfer goods or 
services between each other. It entails the systematic manipulation of prices in order to reduce profits or increase profits 
artificially or cause losses and avoid taxes in a specific country. See Arnold and McIntyre 2002: 53. 
17  In an arm’s length transaction, each party strives to get the utmost possible benefit from the transaction. See Article 9 of 
the OECD MTC, 2010 condensed version (OECD 2010).  
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interest on a loan can be treated as a distribution of dividends for tax purposes (OECD 
1987:15, para 25(i)). In Ghana, for instance, section 31(5)(a) of the Income Tax Act 896 of 
2015 permits the Commissioner General to use the arm’s length principle to re-characterise 
debt financing in a controlled relationship as equity financing. In South Africa, section 31 of 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, as amended by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 24 of 
2011, clearly provides that the arm’s length principle has to be applied to financial assistance 
in cross-border transactions. Although the arm’s length approach recognises that entities 
may have different levels of interest expense depending on their circumstances, it may not 
be effective in preventing BEPS in cases of groups structuring intragroup debt with equity-
like features to justify interest payments that are in excess of those the group actually incurs 
on its third party debt (OECD 2015b: para. 12). The OECD also notes that the arm’s length 
test is not effective in preventing an entity from claiming a deduction for interest expenses 
which is used to fund investments in non-taxable assets or exempt income (OECD 2015b: 
para. 12). It should also be noted that internationally there are no clear guidelines for 
determining the parameters within which the arm’s length principle is to apply in the context 
of thin capitalisation (Oguttu 2013: 314). Consequently, countries tend not to only rely on the 
arm’s length principle to curb thin capitalisation, but they often apply this principle alongside 
fixed debt/equity ratios (explained below). 
 
(b) The fixed ratio approach: This approach, which is based on a fixed debt/equity ratio, 
is normally used as a ‘safe harbour’ in setting the parameters within which the arm’s length 
principle applies. Under this approach, the interest relating to the debt above the fixed ratio is 
not deductible.18 Some countries apply fixed debt/equity ratios exclusively since they are 
considered relatively easier for tax administrations to administer as they can easily link the 
level of the interest expense to a measure of an entity’s economic activity (OECD 2015b: 
para. 17). In Uganda, for instance, section 89 of the Income Tax Act, Cap 340, restricts the 
deduction of interest by a foreign-controlled resident company if 50 per cent or more of the 
resident company is held by a non-resident, where foreign debt to foreign equity ratio 
exceeds 2:1 (KPMG 2013: 13). Ghana’s thin capitalisation rules in section 33 of the Income 
Tax Act 896 of 2015 provide that where a non-resident holds more than 50 per cent of a 
resident company, interest deduction in excess of a debt to equity ratio of 3:1 will be 
disallowed. Despite the presence of fixed ratio rules in some African countries, their revenue 
administrations still find it difficult to deal with excessive interest deductions, since generally 
the tax legislation does not clearly define the difference between what constitutes interest as 
opposed to  equity.19 The OECD has over the years been supportive of the fixed ratio 
approach and it is open to assisting African countries in introducing rules that would be in line 
with international best practices.20 However, it cautions that fixed ratios can be relatively 
inflexible if the same ratio is applied to entities in all sectors. The other concern is that in 
some countries the rates at which these ratios are set are too high to be an effective tool in 
addressing BEPS, or too low, meaning that they can lead to double taxation risks.21 A rule 
which can limit the amount of debt in an entity can still allow significant flexibility in terms of 
the rate of interest that an entity may pay on that debt, which makes it relatively easy for a 
MNE to manipulate the outcome of a ratio by increasing the level of equity in a particular 
entity. Due to these disadvantages, the OECD advises that although the fixed ratio approach 
can play a role within the overall tax policy to limit interest deductions, in general it is not a 
best practice approach to tackle BEPS (OECD 2015b: para. 17). 
 
(c) Withholding taxes: Some countries levy withholding taxes on interest as a means of 
preventing the erosion of their tax bases. A withholding tax is used as a mechanism to 
enable the collection of taxes from non-residents, by appointing a resident as the non-
resident’s agent and imposing an obligation on the resident agent to withhold a certain 
                                                          
18  ATAF Second Meeting: Cross Border Taxation Technical Committee, 3-4 March 2015.  
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid. 
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percentage of tax from payments made to the non-resident. If the resident agent does not 
comply with this duty or if he/she withholds an incorrect amount of tax, personal liability can 
be imposed on the resident agent (Olivier and Honiball 2011: 362-363). Many African 
countries levy withholding taxes on interest because this mechanism is considered a 
relatively mechanical tool which is easy to apply and administer (OECD 2015b: para. 13). In 
Uganda, for example, section 83(1) of Uganda’s Income Tax Act, Cap 340 (subject to certain 
exemptions) levies a withholding tax of 15 per cent on gross interest payments to non-
residents from sources in Uganda. In Ghana’s section 116 of Income Tax Act 896 of 2015, a 
withholding tax of 8 per cent is levied on interest paid to non-residents. In South Africa, 
(subject to certain exemptions) a withholding tax on interest is levied under sections 37I to 
37M of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, at a rate of 15 per cent on interest received by or 
accrued by a non-resident from a South African source (De Koker 2016: para 14.4). Where 
there is a double tax treaty in place, withholding tax rates on interest are normally reduced to 
10 per cent for double taxation agreements (DTAs) based on Article 11 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention (OECD MTC). Any double taxation that arises is usually addressed in terms 
of Article 23A of the OECD MTC by giving credit in the country where the interest payment is 
received. In practice, however, interest withholding tax in most African countries’ tax treaties 
is often reduced below 10 per cent (sometimes to zero) – which opens such treaties to abuse 
(OECD 2015b: para. 13). One would imagine that perhaps the best way to prevent base 
eroding excessive interest deductions is to set the withholding tax at the same rate as 
corporate tax; however this may hamper foreign investment (UN 2015a: 180). It should also 
be noted that lenders often minimise the impact of withholding taxes by ‘grossing up’ such 
payments so that the domestic company that borrowed the loan bears the cost of the 
withholding tax in the form of a higher interest charge (UN 2015a: 180). Since the high 
interest rate is a tax deductible expense in calculating tax income, this further reduces the 
borrower country’s tax base. For the above reasons, the OECD advises that countries should 
apply withholding taxes alongside other best practices as discussed below (OECD 2015b: 
para. 13). 
 
(d) Debt/EBITDA ratios: Some countries apply debt/EBITDA (Earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortisation) ratios to prevent excessive interest deductions (OECD 
2015b: para. 18). A debt/EBITDA ratio is a metric measure of a company's ability to pay off 
its short-term incurred debt by giving an investor the approximate amount of time that would 
be needed to pay off all debt. The metric ratio is calculated as debt divided by earnings, 
before factors such as interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) are taken into 
account. A high debt/EBITDA ratio suggests that a company may not be able to service its 
debt in an appropriate manner and can result in a lowered credit rating. Conversely, a low 
ratio can suggest that the company may want to take on more debt if needed and it often 
warrants a relatively high credit rating.22 Although debt/EBITDA ratios may be useful, the fact 
that they do not include the effects of the company’s expenditures on its finances requires 
that they should be used with caution when evaluating a company, as not all of the 
company’s risk is accounted for in the ratio.23 For example, South Africa’s Revenue Service 
(SARS) issued a draft interpretation note on thin capitalisation in 2013 (SARS 2013) in which 
it indicated that it has adopted a risk-based audit approach in selecting potential thin 
capitalisation cases for audit. In selecting cases, SARS will consider transactions in which 
the debt/EBITDA ratio of the South African taxpayer exceeds 3:1 to be of greater risk. SARS 
explains that the ratio is not a safe harbour and it does not preclude SARS from auditing a 
taxpayer who is within the range of the abovementioned ratio (SARS 2013: 3).  
 
                                                          
22  Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/debt_edbitda.asp#axzz2AxUfUVka (accessed 28 November 2016); 
see also ‘Explanation of Debt to EBITDA Ratio, http://www.ehow.com/info_7856136_explanation-debt-ebitda-
ratio.html#ixzz2AxWymT1e (accessed 28 November 2016). 
23  The Free Dictionary, ‘Debt/EBITDA ratio’, at http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Debt%2FEBITDA+ratio 
(accessed 28 November 2016). 
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(e) Rules which compare the level of debt in an entity by reference to the corporate 
group’s overall position: These group ratio tests typically operate by reference to debt/equity 
ratios. However in many cases the amount of equity in an entity may at best only be an 
indirect measure of its level of activity and can be subject to manipulation (OECD 2015b: 
para. 19).  
 
(f) Targeted anti-avoidance rules: These rules disallow interest expenses on specific 
transactions. Unlike other African countries, South Africa’s developed financial services 
sector has prompted the country to enact various targeted provisions in its Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962 to prevented sophisticated interest deduction tax avoidance schemes: 
 
- section 24J regulates the incurral and accrual of interest in respect of financial 
instruments; 
- section 45 deals with excessive debt transactions using debt pushdown structures in 
intragroup transactions;  
- section 23N limits the deduction of an interest expense incurred by a company on a 
loan or debt raised to acquire assets or shares in reorganisations and acquisition 
transactions;  
- section 23M imposes a limitation on the deductibility of interest in debt owed to persons 
in a controlling relationship;  
- section 24O limits the deduction of interest in respect of share acquisitions;  
- section 10B deals with round-tripping;  
- section 8E and 8EA deem a dividend declared by a company on a hybrid equity 
instrument as interest; 
- section 8F and 8FA deem interest on a hybrid debt instrument to be a dividend in 
specie such that no deduction is allowed on the interest paid by the issuer of the 
instrument.   
 
However, these numerous provisions have complicated the rules relating to cross-border 
debt which can discourage foreign investment especially for investors that are not involved in 
such sophisticated schemes. The downside of such provisions is that as new BEPS schemes 
are exploited, further targeted rules may be required and so there is a tendency over time for 
more rules to be introduced, resulting in a complex system and increased administration and 
compliance costs manipulation (OECD 2015b: para. 20). 
 
1.2 OECD recommendations to curb BEPS from excessive interest deductions 
 
When the OECD issued its BEPS Action Plan in 2013, Action 4 called on countries to come 
up with effective provisions that limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial 
payments. In particular, they were called upon to develop rules that prevent the use of 
related-party and third-party debt to achieve excessive interest deductions as well as rules 
that prevent financing the production of exempt or deferred income (OECD 2013b: 17). The 
OECD evaluated the effectiveness of measures that countries apply to prevent base eroding 
excessive interest deductions and it concluded that the use of arm’s length tests, withholding 
taxes and rules to disallow a percentage of interest are not effective (OECD 2014a: para. 
21).24 The OECD recommends that countries should adopt a consistent approach of utilising 
international best practices if concerns regarding BEPS on interest deductions are to be 
addressed. Such a consistent approach would remove distortions, reduce the risk of 
unintended double taxation, remove opportunities for BEPS and as a result increase fairness 
and equality between groups (OECD 2014a: para. 5).25 Thus in its 2015 final BEPS Report 
on Action 4, the OECD recommends that the best approach to address BEPS is for countries 
to apply a fixed ratio rule which limits an entity’s net deductions for interest and payments 
                                                          
24  OECD Discussion Draft ‘BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments’ (18 December 2014): para 
21. 
25  Ibid. para 5. 
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economically equivalent to interest to a percentage of its EBITDA and that this should apply 
to entities in multinational groups (OECD 2015b: paras. 23, 78, 99). To ensure that countries 
apply a fixed ratio that is low enough to tackle BEPS, while recognising that not all countries 
are in the same position, the OECD recommended an approach that includes a corridor of 
possible ratios of between 10 and 30 per cent (OECD 2015b: paras. 23, 78, 99). The OECD 
recognises that although the fixed ratio rule may provide a country with a level of protection 
against BEPS, it is a blunt tool which does not take into account the fact that groups 
operating in different sectors may require different amounts of leverage, and even groups 
within some sectors can be more highly leveraged for non-tax reasons (which could result in 
double taxation for groups which are leveraged above the level). Thus the OECD 
recommends that the use of a fixed ratio rule can be supplemented by a worldwide group 
ratio rule which allows an entity to exceed this limit in certain circumstances (OECD 2015b: 
paras. 24, 116). This would allow an entity with net interest expense above a country’s fixed 
ratio to deduct interest up to the level of the net interest/EBITDA ratio of its worldwide group. 
Countries may also apply an uplift of up to 10 per cent to the group's net third party interest 
expense to prevent double taxation. The earnings-based worldwide group ratio rule can also 
be replaced by different group ratio rules, such as the ‘equity escape’ rule (which compares 
an entity’s level of equity and assets to those held by its group). A country may also choose 
not to introduce any group ratio rule. In that case it should apply the fixed ratio rule to entities 
in multinational and domestic groups without improper discrimination (OECD 2015b: para. 
119). The recommended approach also allows countries to supplement the fixed ratio rule 
and the group ratio rule with other provisions that reduce the impact of the rules on entities or 
situations which pose less BEPS risk, such as:  
 
- A de minimis threshold which carves out entities which have a low level of net interest 
expense (OECD 2015b: paras. 1, 26). 
- An exclusion for interest paid to third party lenders on loans used to fund public-benefit 
projects, subject to conditions. In these circumstances, an entity may be highly 
leveraged but, due to the nature of the projects and the close link to the public sector, 
the BEPS risk is reduced (OECD 2015b: 12). 
- Provisions to permit carry forward of disallowed interest expense for use in future 
years. This will help entities which incur interest expenses on long-term investments 
that are expected to generate taxable income only in later years, and will allow entities 
with losses to claim interest deductions when they return to profit (OECD 2015b: 12). 
  
Nevertheless, concerns have been raised that the recommendation for an interest rate cap 
within the band of ten and 30 per cent, with the option of using apportioned consolidated 
interest costs if they are higher, seems self-defeating in view of the fact that debt ratios vary 
widely both between economic sectors and firms.26 It has been suggested that a firm rule is 
needed that interest deductions should not be greater in aggregate than the corporate 
group’s consolidated interest costs to third parties. It is also suggested that countries which 
insist on using a fixed cap on deductions should use the lowest limit (BEPS Monitoring Group 
2015: 5).  
 
1.3 General recommendations on curbing excessive interest deductions   
 
As noted in paragraph 1.2 above, the OECD measures for curbing excessive interest 
deductions entail recommendations of best practices that are considered more effective in 
curtailing than in addressing the matter. For African countries, adopting appropriate 
measures to prevent base eroding of excessive interest deductions requires them to balance 
the need to attract foreign investment against the necessity of protecting the tax base. 
Numerous and complex targeted anti-avoidance provisions (as is the case with South Africa) 
                                                          
26  See the study by PwC included as an annex to the comments submitted by the Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee (BIAC) on Action 4, February 2015, http://biac.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2015-Final-BIAC-comments-
interest-deductibility1.pdf (accessed 30 November 2016).  
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may not be advantageous in this regard as they pose overwhelming administrative burdens 
and regulatory uncertainty. On the flipside, although the use of withholding taxes on interest 
may be considered easy to administer, high rates can also discourage foreign investment 
since they are normally levied on a gross basis. 
 
 
2  Action 6: Prevent treaty abuse 
 
Before discussing issues pertaining to treaty abuse, it is important to first provide some 
background as to how DTAs work. DTAs are normally drafted based on certain models. The 
two main models employed that are applied internationally are the OECD Model Convention 
on Income and on Capital, 2014 condensed version (OECD MTC) (OECD: 2014d) and the 
UN Model Tax Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (UN MTC) (UN: 
2011). The OECD MTC embodies rules and proposals by developed capital exporting 
countries. It thus favours capital exporting countries over capital importing countries (Arnold 
and McIntyre 2002: 119). The UN MTC favours capital importing countries over capital 
exporting countries. One of the main reasons why countries entered into DTAs (Reinhold 
2000) (as is found in the preamble of most DTAs) is to prevent double taxation.27 Some 
DTAs have in their preambles that the purpose of the treaty is to prevent double taxation and 
fiscal evasion (Oguttu 2015: 2). Currently the preambles of DTAs do not specify that they are 
not intended to be used for abusive tax avoidance practices.28 Nevertheless, although the 
network of DTAs that countries have entered into encourages international trade and 
investment, it also opens up opportunities to abuse treaties for tax avoidance purposes 
(Oguttu 2004: 242). Taxpayers may for instance get involved in ‘treaty shopping’, a term 
which refers to the use of DTAs by the residents of a non-treaty country in order to obtain 
treaty benefits that are not supposed to be available to them (van Weeghel 1998: 119). This 
is mainly done by interposing a ‘conduit company’ in one of the contracting states so as to 
shift profits out of those states (Wurm 1992 and Tomsett 1989: 149). A conduit company is 
an intermediary company with very narrow powers, which is used for holding assets or rights 
as an agent or nominee on behalf of another company (OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
1987 paras. 4.2 and 5(d) and Oguttu 2007: 238). Treaty shopping is however undesirable 
because it frustrates the spirit of a treaty (OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 1987 para. 4.2). 
The anticipated capital flows are distorted if the treaty is used by third country residents 
(Haug 1996).  
 
2.1 Factors that encourage treaty abuse in Africa 
 
(a) DTAs signed with low tax jurisdictions: As is the case with other countries, the DTAs 
that African countries have signed with low tax countries can be abused as part of 
sophisticated tax planning to frustrate the tax claims of African countries. Most treaty 
shopping schemes in Africa involve companies registered in Mauritius under the Global 
Business Licenses 1 regime (Rohatgi 2002: 284 and Oleynic 2006: 43), which encourages nil 
or minimum tax on active business in Mauritius while taking advantage of other countries’ 
treaty benefits. Mauritius has historically been an established treaty haven for offshore 
activities from African countries. Its extensive tax treaty network, with African countries, and 
its membership of regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community,29 
offers African country tax residents the opportunity to route their investments via Mauritius 
                                                          
27  For the meaning of double taxation see Oguttu 2008. 
28 The term ‘tax avoidance’ refers to the use of legal methods of arranging one’s affairs, so as to pay less tax. This is done 
by utilising loopholes in tax laws and exploiting them within legal parameters. See Oguttu 2015: 2.      
29   Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SADC’s mission is to promote sustainable and equitable growth and to be a 
competitive and effective player in the world economy. For details on SADC member states, see 
http://www.sadc.int/member-states/ (accessed 28 November 2016). 
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and for foreign investors, the opportunity to route their investments in Africa via Mauritius.30 
Apart from Mauritius, African countries have also signed treaties with other low tax 
jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, which have also raised treaty abuse 
concerns. The IMF estimates that treaties with the Netherlands led to foregone revenue for 
developing countries of at least €770 million in 2011 (IMF 2014: 22). Treaties signed with low 
tax jurisdictions encourage treaty abuse because of the following factors: 
 
Low withholding taxes: Because the DTA negotiators of African countries are not as skilled 
as their developed country counterparts in negotiating DTAs (PwC and EuropeAid 2011: 21), 
they often sign DTAs that contain provisions that are not in their favour but rather reflect the 
position of the other contracting state (Akunobera 2012: 1089). Of particular concern is the 
low or zero withholding tax rates for dividends, interest or management fees payable by 
MNEs, which are also often used for treaty shopping purposes. This was one of the main 
reasons why in 2013, Rwanda negotiated its 2001 DTA with Mauritius in which withholding 
taxes were at a zero rate, giving all  taxation rights to Mauritius. The new DTA, which was 
ratified on 4 August 2014, provides a 10 per cent withholding tax on dividends, royalty and 
interest, and 12 per cent for management fees.31 Rwanda Revenue Authority notes that the 
new DTA is intended to stop treaty shopping, where investors would opt to register their 
companies in Mauritius while doing business in Rwanda, and repatriating all their profits 
without paying taxes.32 For this (and other reasons), in 2015, South Africa renegotiated its 
1997 DTA with Mauritius.33 South African residents wishing to invest in India often took 
advantage of the old DTA by routing investments via Mauritius in order to gain tax 
advantages. South African companies also often route investments into other Africa 
countries via Mauritius because it has negotiated better benefits (such as lower withholding 
tax rates) in its tax treaties with some African countries than is the case with South Africa. It 
was also because of similar concerns that in October 2014, the Tax Justice Network 
instituted a case in the Kenya High Court (still undecided at the writing of this article and yet 
unreported) against the Kenyan government and the Kenyan Revenue Authority34 for signing 
a DTA with Mauritius that they allege is riddled with tax abuse loopholes, such as low 
withholding tax rates.35 The Tax Justice Network argues that the DTA contravenes the 
principle of good governance, sustainability, and accountability, in that it is in violation of 
Articles 10 and 201 of the Kenyan Constitution. The DTA was signed on 7 May 2012 and 
ratified by Kenya through a legal notice published in the Kenya Gazette on 23 May 2014 but 
it is not yet in force.  
 
DTA low withholding tax rates have also been a concern for other African countries that have 
signed treaties with other low tax countries like the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
Luxembourg. In June 2013 Malawi terminated its 1969 colonial treaty with the United 
                                                          
30  Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Authority (MOBAA) ‘Mauritius: A Sound Base for The New Millennium’ (5 July 
1999), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=7371&searchresults=1 (accessed 28 November 2016). See also 
Schulze 1997: 185-6. 
31  The East African, ‘Rwanda-Mauritius tax treaty renegotiated’, http://africamoney.info/rwanda-mauritius-tax-treaty-
renegotiated-loopholes-closed/ (accessed 28 November 2016).  
32  The DTA has retroactive application as from 1 January 2013 for Rwanda and as from 1 July 2013 for Mauritius. See The 
East African, ‘Rwanda-Mauritius tax treaty renegotiated’, note 31 above.  
33  South African Government Gazette Number 18111. Date of Entry into Force 20 June 1997. The re-negotiated DTA 
between South Africa and Mauritius is set out in Government Gazette Number 38862 – Entry into Force 28 May 2015. 
34  J. Martin ‘TJN Africa’s challenge to “loophole-ridden” Kenya-Mauritius tax agreement to be heard in Kenya High Court’, 
MNE Tax, 12 November 2015, http://mnetax.com/tjn-africas-court-challenge-to-loophole-ridden-kenya-mauritius-tax-
agreement-moves-forward-11832 (accessed 28 November 2016); and TJN Tax Justice Network-Africa 2015. 
35  Note that the treaty sets the rate for interest at 10 per cent (the domestic tax rate is between 15-25 per cent) but Article 
11 of treaties based on the OECD MTC also limit the interest rate to 10 per cent; for royalties the treaty rate is 10 per 
cent (the domestic rate is 20 per cent) however Article 12 of treaties based on the OECD MTC does not permit source 
countries to tax royalties; for dividends the treaty rate is 5 or 10 per cent depending on the shareholding (the domestic 
rate is 10 per cent). Article 10 of treaties based on the OECD MTC limits the rate to 5 or 25 per cent depending on the 
shareholding. See Axis, ‘Kenya – Mauritius DTA ratified by the Republic of Kenya’, http://www.axis.mu/uploads/DTA-
%20Mauritius%20&%20Kenya.pdf (accessed 28 November 2016). 
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Kingdom, Northern Ireland and the Netherlands for this very reason.36 In 2014 Malawi re-
signed a treaty with the Netherlands (IMF 2014: 28) in the terms of which dividends will be 
subject to 5 per cent withholding tax in the case of shareholdings of at least 10 per cent, and 
the standard rates in both countries will apply to other dividends. Interest will be taxed at 10 
per cent and royalties at 5 per cent. The low withholding tax rates in the Netherlands’ DTAs 
with other African countries can still be prone to treaty shopping. For example, South Africa’s 
treaty with the Netherlands can be subjected to treaty shopping by third country residents in 
order to circumvent South Africa’s dividends withholding tax, which is imposed at a statutory 
rate of 15 per cent on dividend distributions by the subsidiary to its parent company.37 To 
circumvent this withholding tax rate, investments can be channelled through an intermediate 
holding company established in the Netherlands, to take advantage of the Netherlands/South 
African DTA, which limits the dividend withholding tax to 5 per cent provided the Dutch 
holding company holds at least directly or indirectly 25 per cent of the voting power in the 
company paying the dividends.38 The dividends could also qualify for the Dutch participation 
exemption39 for foreign dividends. The Netherlands/South African DTA can also be used to 
reduce the South African withholding tax on royalties,40 levied at a rate of 15 per cent and 
reduced to zero in the treaty. Investors from a third country can license the supply of 
intellectual property (IP) to the Dutch holding company, which can sub-license the use of the 
IP to the South African subsidiary, thus avoiding the royalty withholding tax. The Dutch 
holding company may also not be subject to tax in the Netherlands, since it does not impose 
any withholding tax on royalties paid to a non-resident and merely requires a small margin for 
a Dutch holding company.41 
 
Avoiding capital gains tax (CGT): Most African countries levy CGT. In a treaty context, Article 
13(1) of treaties based on either the OECD or the UN MTC provides that income from the 
alienation of immovable property located in a country shall be taxable in that state. Article 
13(2) gives the source country the right to tax capital gains derived from a PE located in that 
country. Article 13(3) is a special rule for gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft 
operated in international traffic which are taxable where the place of effective management of 
the enterprise is situated. In all other cases, (save for the anti-avoidance rule of Article 13(4) 
which is discussed ahead), Article 13(5) gives the right to tax proceeds from the alienation of 
any property to the resident state of the alienator. Article 13(5) presents BEPS concerns 
especially in treaties with low tax jurisdictions like Mauritius which does not impose CGT on 
its companies, with the result that companies investing through Mauritius completely avoid 
paying CGT and are able to earn large profits from their investments.  
 
For example the Kenya/Mauritius DTA referred to above, which was ratified by Kenya on 23 
May 2014,42 provides that capital gains arising from transfer of shares of a company shall be 
taxable only in the state in which the alienator is a resident. This implies that if the alienator is 
resident in Mauritius, then Mauritius would have the right to tax the gains derived from 
disposing of the shares. However since Mauritius does not levy CGT, those gains would not 
be subject to tax. 
 
                                                          
36  MNE Tax, Multinational tax and transfer pricing news, ‘Netherlands renegotiates tax treaties with developing nations to 
add anti-abuse clause’, http://mnetax.com/netherlands-renegotiates-tax-treaties-ethiopia-ghana-kenya-zambia-to-add-
antiabuse-clause-hopes-add-clause-23-treaties-9530 (accessed 28 November 2016). 
37  Dividends withholding tax in South Africa is levied in terms of section of 64D to 64N of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.  
38  Article 10(2) of the Netherlands/South Africa DTA. 
39  A participation exemption can be defined as a tax regime under which dividends received from foreign companies by 
resident companies are exempt from resident country tax if the resident company owns at least some percentage of the 
shares of the foreign company. See Arnold and McIntyre 2002: 165 and Deloitte ‘Taxation and Investment in 
Netherlands 2015’: 10, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-netherlandsguide-
2015.pdf (accessed 29 November 2016). 
40  Interest withholding tax in South Africa is levied in terms of section 37I to 37M of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
41  Deloitte ‘Taxation and investment in Netherlands 2015’, as note 39 above: para 4.3.  
42  MNE Tax, Multinational tax and transfer pricing news, as note 36 above. 
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In such situations, it is advisable for African countries to negotiate a provision in their DTAs 
to the effect that if the investor’s resident country does not levy tax on a particular type of 
income then the source country would not give away its taxing right. As hinted above, Article 
13(4) is an anti-avoidance measure, which provides that gains from the alienation of shares 
deriving more than 50 per cent of their value directly or indirectly from immovable property 
situated in a contracting state may be taxed in that state. However many African countries do 
not have this anti-avoidance rule in their DTAs. Thus MNEs often incorporate conduit 
companies in low tax jurisdictions, which are used to dispose of their shares in assets 
located in African countries so that the proceeds appear to be derived from such 
jurisdictions, thereby avoiding CGT in the relevant African countries. This is exemplified by 
the Ugandan court case of Zain International BV v Commissioner General of Uganda 
Revenue Authority.43 In this case, Zain International BV (hereinafter referred to as Zain) 
disposed of its shares in Zain Africa BV to Bharti Airtel International BV on 30 March 2010. 
All the three companies are incorporated and resident in the Netherlands. Zain Africa BV had 
equity interest in 26 Dutch BV Companies, among which was Celtel Uganda Holding BV that 
owned 99.99 per cent of Celtel Uganda Ltd. The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) issued a 
tax assessment on Zain on the grounds that the transaction was one of gain arising from the 
disposal of an interest in immovable property located in Uganda, in terms of Article 13 of the 
DTA between Uganda and the Netherlands. Zain contended that the income was not 
sourced from Uganda as it had sold its shares in the Netherlands to a Netherlands entity, 
and so its income was sourced in the Netherlands and not in Uganda. The High Court, which 
did not consider the substantive tax treaty issues in the case, ruled that the URA had no 
jurisdiction to tax Zain International BV. The URA appealed this decision in the Court of 
Appeal, which ruled that Uganda had jurisdiction to tax proceeds on sale of shares between 
two foreign companies involving the sale of assets in Uganda. The Court of Appeal gave the 
URA an opportunity to study the transaction again and determine what taxes to claim. 
However Zain has applied for Mutual Agreement Procedure in the Netherlands to resolve the 
case.44 It is argued that if Uganda had secured the Article 13(4) anti-abuse provision in its 
treaty with the Netherlands, it would have been in a much more certain position in its claim 
against Zain (Hearson 2015: 24). This matter is one of the concerns that the Tax Justice 
Network raises in its above mentioned case against the Kenyan government with regard to 
the loopholes in the Kenyan/Mauritius treaty. Despite the anti-avoidance rule in Article 13(4) 
of the OECD MTC, which gives the right to tax shares to the source state, the 
Kenya/Mauritius DTA provides that capital gains on the disposal of shares by a Mauritius 
resident are only taxed in the residence state (Mauritius). In effect Kenya has given away the 
right to tax capital gains from stock sales of Kenyan companies to Mauritius, which does not 
levy CGT.45 
 
(b) Abuse of tax sparing provisions in tax treaties: Treaty shopping is also encouraged by 
the tax sparing provisions that many African countries often insist on having in their DTAs 
with developed countries in an effort to encourage foreign investment (Easson 2004: 1-2; 
Hines 2001: 40; Holland and Vann 1989: 986). The argument is that when a developing 
country grants a tax incentive to an investor from a developed country treaty partner, the tax 
incentive may be eliminated or reduced where the investor’s country applies the credit 
method to prevent the double taxation of income (Hines 2001: 40). To preserve the benefit of 
tax incentives granted to the foreign investor, a ‘tax sparing’ provision is included in the DTA, 
in terms of which the developed country amends its taxation of foreign source income to 
allow its residents who invest in developing countries to retain the tax incentives provided by 
                                                          
43  High Court of Uganda at Kampala (Civil Division) Miscellaneous Cause No. 96 of 2011. 
44  Mutual Agreement Procedure to resolve treaty disputes is set out in Article 25 of the Uganda/Netherlands DTA, which 
entered into force 10 September 2006. See D.K. Kalinaki ‘Court gives URA nod to seek taxes on sale of Zain assets in 
Uganda’ The East African, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/URA-taxes-on-sale-of-Zain-assets-in-Uganda/-
/2558/2451578/-/item/0/-/6hm2he/-/index.html (accessed 29 November 2016).  
45  J. Martin, ‘TJN Africa’s challenge to “loophole-ridden” Kenya-Mauritius tax agreement’ to be heard in Kenya High Court’ 
MNE Tax, 12 November 2015, http://mnetax.com/tjn-africas-court-challenge-to-loophole-ridden-kenya-mauritius-tax-
agreement-moves-forward-11832 (accessed 28 November 2016); and TJN 2015: 104. 
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those countries (Rohatgi 20012: 213). The developed country is thus required to give a tax 
credit to the investor for the taxes that would have been paid to the developing country if the 
incentive had not been granted (Oguttu 2001: para. 2; Brooks 2008-9: 208). Tax sparing has, 
however, become rather unpopular and several developed countries have become restrictive 
in including tax sparing provisions in their tax treaties (Thuronyi 2003: 301). It is reasoned 
that tax sparing may not be that instrumental in promoting foreign investment and that it 
encourages abusive tax practices (Arnold and McIntyre 2002: 52-53) such as treaty 
shopping. Generous tax sparing credits in a particular treaty can encourage residents of third 
countries to establish conduit entities in the country granting the tax incentive (Arnold and 
McIntyre 2002: 52-53). Treaty shopping as a result of the tax sparing provision in the 1997 
South Africa/Mauritius DTA was one of the reasons why it was renegotiated in 2015.46 The 
DTA no longer includes a tax sparing clause; rather, it allows for relief in the form of a foreign 
tax credit.47   
 
Wrapping up on the factors that encourage treaty abuse in Africa, it should be noted though 
that in many African countries, the issue of curbing treaty shopping has not received much 
attention even though African tax officials often deal with multinational companies involved in 
treaty shopping. Most African countries’ tax officials acknowledge that DTA negotiations have 
not fully taken into account the way DTAs could allow certain jurisdictions to act as conduits 
for tax avoidance (Hearson 2015: 6). However, over the last couple of years, there have 
been measures by some African countries to address issues of treaty abuse. In Ghana, effort 
is being made to strengthen the way DTAs are negotiated by doing more research into the 
potential treaty partner beforehand and bringing more diverse expertise into the negotiating 
team (ActionAid 2012: 22). In 2014, the Government of Uganda announced that it had 
suspended all of its ongoing DTA negotiations pending a review into the treaty terms that the 
nation should seek in such negotiations.48 Several African countries have renegotiated some 
of their DTAs that encouraged tax abuse. As stated above, in 2014 Malawi re-negotiated its 
DTA with the Netherlands; in 2015 South Africa re-negotiated its treaty with Mauritius (IMF 
2014: 28); and Zambia is re-negotiating several of its old colonial-era treaties that were 
negotiated on poor terms (Hearson 2015: 1). 
 
2.2 Current measures to prevent treaty shopping 
 
To prevent treaty shopping, currently paragraph 7.1 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the 
OECD MTC (OECD: 2014d) provides that where taxpayers are tempted to abuse the tax 
laws of a State by exploiting the differences between various countries’ laws, such attempts 
may be countered by jurisprudential rules that are part of the domestic law of the state 
concerned (for example general anti-abuse rules and judicial anti-abuse doctrines like the 
substance over form doctrine)49 as well as the use of specific treaty anti-avoidance 
provisions (OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 1987 para. 4.2). For example, Ghana has a 
general anti-avoidance provision in section 34 of Income Tax Act 896 of 2015 to inter alia 
curb fictitious schemes whose form does not reflect their substance. South Africa also has 
general anti-avoidance provisions in section 80A-80L of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and it 
also applies the substance over form common law doctrine to prevent tax avoidance. 
 
                                                          
46  The re-negotiated DTA between South Africa and Mauritius is set out in Government Gazette Number 38862 – Entry 
into Force 28 May 2015. 
47  See Article 22(2) of the DTA between South Africa and Mauritius. South African Government Gazette Number 38862 – 
Entry into Force 28 May 2015. 
48  Ladu ‘Govt suspends Double Taxation pacts’, Daily Monitor, 6 June 2014, http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Govt-
suspends-Double-Taxation-pacts/688322-2338432-dkw4jwz/index.html (accessed 29 November 2016); Hearson 2015: 
1; and TreatyPro.com ‘Latest Treaty Updates: Uganda’, 10 June 2014, 
http://www.treatypro.com/treaties_by_country/uganda.asp (accessed 29 November 2016).   
49 Roper and Ware 2000: 77, where the ‘substance over form’ doctrine is described as a doctrine which permits the tax 
authorities to ignore the legal form of a tax arrangement and look at the actual substance of the relevant transaction.  
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Although the commentaries on both the OECD and the UN MTC contend that there is no 
conflict between DTA provisions and domestic anti-avoidance rules since the latter merely 
establish the facts to which DTAs apply,50 DTA provisions are generally considered to prevail 
over domestic law since a DTA is a contract between the contracting states. To prevent 
arguments about treaty override, it is necessary that countries enact domestic anti-abuse 
rules that mirror the anti-abuse rules in their DTAs.  
 
Currently the OECD and UN Commentaries on Article 1 also set out various examples of 
specific provisions that may be included in tax treaties to curtail treaty shopping.51 The main 
provision applied in most tax DTAs (even those signed by African countries) is the ‘beneficial 
ownership’ provision normally in Articles 10, 11 and 12 of both the OECD and UN MTCs, 
which deal with the taxation of interest, dividends and royalties respectively.52 Although the 
meaning of ‘beneficial ownership’ has internationally been unclear,53 the provision is intended 
to deny treaty benefits (in particular, reduced withholding tax on interest, dividends and 
royalties) to a conduit company, unless the beneficial owner is a resident of one of the 
contracting states.54 However the effectiveness of the beneficial ownership provision in 
curbing treaty shopping is now questionable in light of international court decisions such as 
the Canadian cases of Velcro Canada Inc. v The Queen55 and Prevost Car Inc. v The 
Queen, which ruled that the relevant taxpayers were beneficial owners and entitled to treaty 
benefits.56 The OECD acknowledges the limits of using the beneficial ownership provision as 
a tool to address various treaty-shopping situations.57 Thus in paragraph 12.5 of the 2014 
version of the Commentary on Article 10, the OECD explains that: ‘whilst the concept of 
‘beneficial ownership’ deals with some forms of tax avoidance (i.e. those involving the 
interposition of a recipient who is obliged to pass on the dividend to someone else), it does 
not deal with other cases of treaty shopping and must not, therefore, be considered as 
restricting in any way the application of other approaches to addressing such cases’. 
 
2.3 OECD BEPS recommendations on preventing treaty abuse   
 
The OECD BEPS report on Action 6 notes that although current rules to prevent treaty abuse 
work well in many cases, they need to be adapted to prevent BEPS that results from 
interactions in more than two countries so as to fully account for global value chains (OECD 
2013b: 19). In its 2015 Final Report on Action 6 (OECD 2015c) the OECD came up with 
minimum standards to prevent the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances. 
In this regard, the OECD noted that a distinction has to be made between:  
 
a) Cases where a person tries to circumvent the provisions of domestic tax law to 
gain treaty benefits. In these cases, treaty shopping must be addressed through 
domestic anti-abuse rules (as discussed above) (OECD 2015c: para. 15). 
                                                          
50  Para. 22 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD MTC; Arnold 2004. 
51  For example, the look through approach; subject to tax provisions; limitation of benefits provision; and the beneficial 
ownership provision. See Paras. 12-20 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD MTC 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-
condensed-version-2014_mtc_cond-2014-en#page1(accessed 29 November 2016). The provisions are explained in 
Oguttu 2007. 
52 Article 10(2) of the OECD MTC. 
53  For example, para. 4.1 of the OECD MTC Commentary on Article 12 only indicates that a nominee or agent cannot be a 
beneficial owner; so is the case with a conduit company which has very narrow powers. 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-
condensed-version-2014_mtc_cond-2014-en#page1 (accessed 29 November 2016). See also International Fiscal 
Association 2000: 22.  
54  Para 12.2 of the Commentary on Article 10 of the OECD MTC. 
55  2012 TCC 57. 
56  2008 TCC 231. 
57  OECD ‘Clarification of the Meaning of “Beneficial Ownership” in the OECD Model Tax Convention: Discussion Draft’ (29 
April 2011 to 15 July 2011): 2, www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/47643872.pdf (accessed 8 December 2016).  
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b) Cases where a person tries to circumvent limitations provided by the treaty itself. 
The OECD recommends that this should be addressed through treaty anti-abuse 
rules, using a three-pronged approach. 
(i) The title and preamble of treaties should clearly state that the treaty is not 
intended to create opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through 
treaty shopping (OECD 2015c: 9). Such a provision augments the treaty 
interpretation approach of preventing treaty abuse in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that treaties are to be 
interpreted in good faith and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.58 
(ii) The inclusion of a specific limitation of benefits provision (LOB rule), which is 
normally included in treaties concluded by the United States and a few other 
countries. The OECD is of the view that such a specific rule will address a large 
number of treaty shopping situations based on the legal nature, ownership in, 
and general activities of, residents of a contracting state (OECD 2015c: para. 19).  
(iii) To address other forms of treaty abuse, not covered by the LOB rule (such as 
certain conduit financing arrangements), tax treaties should include a more 
general anti-abuse rule based on the principal purpose test (PPT) rule. This rule 
is intended to provide a clear statement that the contracting states intend to deny 
the application of the provisions of their treaties when transactions or 
arrangements are entered into in order to obtain the benefits of these provisions 
in inappropriate circumstances (OECD 2015c: para. 19).  
 
The OECD acknowledges that each rule has strengths and weaknesses and may not be 
appropriate for all countries (OECD 2015c: para. 20). It thus advises that the rules may be 
adapted to the specificities of individual States and the circumstances of the negotiation of 
DTAs. For example, some countries may have constitutional or certain legal restrictions that 
prevent them from adopting the recommendations. Some countries may have domestic anti-
abuse rules or interpretative tools developed by their courts that prevent some of the treaty 
abuses. In other cases, the administrative capacity of some countries (a major issue in 
African countries) may prevent them from applying certain detailed anti-abuse rules and 
require them to adopt more general anti-abuse provisions (for example the PPT rule) (OECD 
2015c: para. 21).  Nevertheless, the OECD recommends that at a minimum level, to protect 
against treaty abuse, countries should include in their tax treaties an express statement that 
their common intention is to eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for non-
taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance, including through treaty 
shopping arrangements (OECD 2015c: para. 22). This intention should be implemented 
through either: 
 
- using the combined LOB and PPT approach described above; or  
- the inclusion of the PPT rule or; 
- the inclusion of the LOB rule supplemented by a mechanism (such as a restricted PPT 
rule applicable to conduit financing arrangements, or domestic anti-abuse rules or 
judicial doctrines that would achieve a similar result) that would deal with conduit 
arrangements not already dealt with in tax treaties (OECD 2015c: para. 22).  
 
To ensure that African countries can effectively curtail treaty shopping, it is important that the 
right provisions, depending on their specific circumstances, are put in place. In principle, 
African countries should ensure that the preamble to all future DTAs they negotiate, or older 
DTAs they re-negotiate, should refer to the fact that the purpose of the treaty is not to create 
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance, 
including through treaty shopping arrangements.   
 
                                                          
58  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. 
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Regarding the feasibility of applying the LOB provision in preventing treaty shopping in 
Africa, it is important to understand the features of this provision (which was adopted from 
the USA). Essentially, the provision restricts entitlement to treaty benefits where a person is 
technically a treaty resident but lacks substantial connection with the residence jurisdiction. 
To be entitled to treaty benefits, such a resident has to pass the tests of a ‘qualified person’ 
(OECD 2015c: 21. In a nutshell, the terms of the provision as set out in the 2014 discussion 
draft on Action 6 provided that: 
 
- A resident of a contracting state shall not be entitled to treaty benefits unless he/she 
constitutes a ‘qualified person’, which term is defined by reference to the nature or 
attributes of various categories of persons.    
- A person is however entitled to the benefits of the treaty even if he/she does not 
constitute a ‘qualified person’ where (subject to certain exceptions) the relevant income 
is derived in connection with the active conduct of a trade or business in that person’s 
State of residence. This ‘derivative benefits’ test allows certain entities owned by 
residents of other States to obtain treaty benefits that these residents would have 
obtained if they had invested directly.  
- The LOB provision however provides for discretionary relief in that even if a taxpayer 
does not qualify for tax benefits, he/she may request to be treated as a qualified person 
if he/she is engaged in the active conduct of a business in its State of residence and 
the income is derived in connection with, or is incidental to, that business. In that case, 
the competent authority of a contracting state may grant treaty benefits where the other 
provisions of the LOB rule would otherwise deny these benefits (OECD 2015c: 21).   
 
Essentially, this version of the LOB provision requires that treaty benefits (such as reduced 
withholding rates) are available only to companies that meet specific tests of having some 
genuine presence in the treaty country. However, such an LOB provision has not been 
applied in many DTAs other than those signed by the USA, and even then, the provisions 
vary from treaty to treaty. South Africa, for instance (one of the few African countries that has 
a DTA with the USA – others are Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia)59 has an LOB provision in 
Article 22 of its 1997 DTA with the USA.60 Although the LOB provision may be an effective 
anti-abuse provision, and although it offers some flexibility that allows for competent authority 
discretion, concerns have been raised that a complex LOB may hamper the ability of African 
countries with weak and limited administrative capacity to apply it, as it requires countries to 
have access to information so as to verify the pre-requisites of qualifying for treaty benefits 
(IMF 2014: 27). It should also be noted that in most cases, complex LOB provisions are 
intended to cover a number of sophisticated financing transactions that typically would not be 
an issue in developing African countries (UN 2015a: 33). In its 2015 Final Report, the OECD 
considered some simplified versions of LOB provisions (OECD 2015c: para. 25), which are 
now set out in Article 8 of the Multilateral Convention that the OECD finalised in 2016 in 
terms of Action 15 of the BEPS Report. The Multilateral Instrument is intended help countries 
implement tax treaty-related measures to prevent BEPS, without renegotiating each of their 
tax treaties (OECD 2016: Article 8). It is interesting to note that some African countries, such 
as Uganda, have a limited form of a LOB provision in their domestic tax laws. Section 88(5) 
of the Ugandan Income Tax Act (Cap. 340, as amended), provides that the benefits of any 
bilateral treaty are not available to a partner state-resident enterprise if 50 per cent or more 
of the underlying ownership of that enterprise of a partner state is controlled by individuals 
who are not resident in the partner state. Application of this domestic provision in a treaty, 
where there is no such provision in the treaty itself, may create disputes, as section 88(2) of 
Uganda’s Income Tax Act clearly provides that an international agreement entered into by 
the government of Uganda with any foreign country prevails over the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act. The IMF advises that if developing countries adopt the LOB provision in 
                                                          
59  IRS ‘United States income tax treaties A to Z’ https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/United-States-
Income-Tax-Treaties---A-to-Z (accessed 29 November 2016). 
60 Published in Government Gazette No. 185553 of 15/12/1997. 
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their domestic law, they should also adopt the provision in their DTAs to prevent treaty 
override concerns (IMF 2014: 28). 
 
With regards to the use of a PPT test as a general measure to prevent treaty shopping, this 
could be a feasible approach for African countries, especially those that do not have general 
anti-avoidance provisions that could serve a similar purpose. In this regard, Ghana could be 
emulated, as it has a general anti-avoidance rule in section 34 of Income Tax Act 896 of 
2015 that clearly defines tax avoidance to include any arrangement whose main purpose is 
to reduce or avoid tax liability. A similar main purpose provision exists in South Africa’s 
general anti-avoidance provisions in section 80A-80L of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. The 
treaty PPT test, which has most of its influence from the United Kingdom, requires that treaty 
benefits are denied if one of the principle purposes of the transaction is to avoid taxation by 
taking advantage of treaty benefits (OECD 2015c: para 19). Over the last two years, the 
Netherlands appears to have changed its tax treaty policy with developing countries, which 
shows a proactive approach to using the PPT to prevent treaty abuse. The re-signed 2014 
Netherlands/Malawi DTA contains an anti-treaty abuse provision (IMF 2014: 28) in Articles 
10, 11, 12 (which deal with interest, dividends and royalties respectively) to the effect that no 
relief shall be granted if the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person is to 
take advantage of the treaty. The provision requires the competent authority of the 
contracting State which has to grant the benefits to consult with the competent authority of 
the other State before denying the benefits. The Netherlands has also renegotiated tax 
treaties with 23 other developing countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Zambia. 
Each of these treaties has a PPT anti-abuse provision.61 The re-negotiated treaties also 
cover a provision on assistance in collection of taxes and also exchange of information in tax 
matters – which will be instrumental in uncovering BEPS practices. It is worth noting that for 
DTAs based on the UN MTC, paragraph 23 of the Commentary on Article 1 (UN: 2011) 
provides the following ‘guiding principle’ in dealing with situations relating to abuse or 
improper use of a treaty:  
 
A guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation convention should not be 
available where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements 
was to secure a more favourable tax position and obtaining that more favourable tax 
treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the 
relevant provisions. 
 
It should however be noted that tests such as the PPT which rely upon notions of ‘purpose’ 
or ‘intention’ are normally difficult for tax administrations to administer and for taxpayers to 
comply with, as they require proof of intent. It would be advisable that in addition to such 
tests, African countries also rely on other more mechanical tests like the LOB provision to 
control the abuse of treaties (UN 2015a: 284). 
 
Apart from the above provisions, the OECD also suggests specific anti-abuse provisions 
regarding certain types of income that countries must have in place. I will briefly pick on just 
two of them that are pertinent to African countries. The OECD recommends that countries 
should ensure their DTAs have Article 17(2) which is in both the OECD and the UN MTCs, 
and is aimed at personal services companies used by entertainers and athletes to avoid 
source-country tax. The OECD also recommends that countries should have Article 13(4) 
(discussed above) in their DTAs which allows countries to tax gains from the sale of shares 
of real estate holding companies to prevent the use of such companies to avoid taxation on 
gains on the underlying real estate. As discussed above, if Uganda had this provision in its 
DTA with Netherlands, it would have had a clear-cut claim in its case against Zain 
                                                          
61  MNE Tax, Multinational tax and transfer pricing news ‘Netherlands renegotiates tax treaties with developing nations to 
add anti-abuse clause’. Available at http://mnetax.com/netherlands-renegotiates-tax-treaties-ethiopia-ghana-kenya-
zambia-to-add-antiabuse-clause-hopes-add-clause-23-treaties-9530 (accessed 29 November 2016). 
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International.62 Currently paragraph 28.5 of the Commentary on Article 13(4) (OECD: 2014d) 
provides that States may want to consider extending the provision to cover not only gains 
from shares but also gains from the alienation of interests in other entities, such as 
partnerships or trusts, which would address one form of abuse. Under the BEPS project, the 
OECD has agreed that Article 13(4) will be amended to include such wording (OECD 2015c: 
para. 42). This development is most welcome for African countries that are concerned about 
investors circumventing CGT on the alienation of assets situated in in their jurisdictions. The 
OECD also noted that there might be cases where assets are contributed to an entity shortly 
before the sale of the shares or other interests in that entity, in order to dilute the proportion 
of the value of these shares or interests that is derived from immovable property situated in 
one contracting state. In order to address such cases, it was agreed that Article 13(4) should 
be amended to refer to situations where shares or similar interest derive their value primarily 
from immovable property at any time during a certain period, as opposed to at the time of the 
alienation only (OECD 2015c: para. 43). 
 
Although the OECD has recommended provisions that countries could include in their DTAs 
to prevent treaty shopping, it is noteworthy that in general African countries are sceptical 
about extending their limited treaty network due to concerns about treaty abuse that are 
exacerbated by their general lack of treaty negotiating capacity. Indeed the IMF’s 2014 report 
on spillovers  recommends that developing countries should sign DTAs with considerable 
caution so as to guard against treaty shopping (IMF 2014: 22). It also recommends that due 
to the risks involved in signing tax treaties, ‘countries should be well-advised before signing 
the treaties and that they should not enter treaties lightly’, which is the case for many African 
countries that have signed DTAs mainly as political gestures (IMF 2014: 28). The IMF also 
notes that although one of the perceived advantages of a DTA is that it signals a strong 
commitment that gives tax assurance to foreign investors, such assurance can be achieved if 
a country builds up credibility in its tax policymaking capabilities (IMF 2014: 28). Before 
signing a DTA with any country, the IMF recommends that capital-importing countries (which 
is what most African countries are) should first consider whether they can achieve more by 
signing a treaty or by simply providing for key aspects (for example the permanent 
establishment definition – discussed below – and withholding tax rates) in their own domestic 
law to protect the tax base, as the envisaged benefits that a DTA could provide may actually 
be of relatively little value. Other important administrative aspects of DTAs, such as those 
relating to exchange of information in tax matters, could be achieved through signing Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA)63 which provide a forum to exchange information 
even where a double tax treaty is not in place. For example, Kenya has initiated the process 
of signing TIEAs with Guernsey, Seychelles, Singapore and Bermuda, and is negotiating with 
Jersey, Cayman Islands, Isle of Man, and Malta (Taxwise 2014). South Africa has signed 
TIEAs with a number of countries including the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, 
Guernsey, Jersey and San Marino.64 The IMF also notes that treaty administrative aspects, 
such as assistance in the collection of taxes, can also be achieved by signing the OECD 
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.65 African 
countries (which could be emulated) that have signed but not have not yet ratified this 
multilateral instrument are: Gabon, Kenya and Morocco. Those for which the treaty has now 
entered into force are: Cameroon (entered into force 1 October 2015), Ghana (entered into 
force 1 September 2013), Mauritius (entered into force 1 December 2015); Nigeria (entered 
                                                          
62  Zain International BV v Commissioner General of Uganda Revenue Authority. High Court of Uganda at Kampala (Civil 
Division) Miscellaneous Cause No. 96 of 2011. 
63  In 2002 the OECD’s Global Forum developed a Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters. See 
Oguttu 2014. 
64  SARS ‘International Tax Treaties – Tax Information Exchange Agreements’, http://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/International-
Treaties-Agreements/Pages/Exchange-of-Information-Agreements-(Bilateral).aspx (accessed 8 December 2016).  
65  IMF 2014: 28. The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters was developed by the Council of 
Europe and the OECD for member states in 1988. In 2010, the Convention was amended by a Protocol and opened to 
all countries. See OECD ‘Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters’, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/conventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters.htm 
(accessed 29 November 2016)   
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into force 1 September 2015), Senegal (entered into force 1 December 2016), Seychelles 
(entered into force 1 October 2015), South Africa (entered into force 1 March 2014), Tunisia 
(entered into force 1 February 2014) and Uganda (1 September 2016).66 ATAF also has a 
multilateral convention (which is not yet in force), which will be instrumental to African 
member countries since low tax jurisdictions like Mauritius are a part of it. It is thus important 
that African country tax administrations that are not part of ATAF endeavour to sign the 
ATAF Convention.  
 
For African countries that are keen to expand their existing DTA network (UN 2015a: 275), 
but are not sure whether to enter into a DTA or terminate the abusive ones in place, the 
OECD, under its BEPS project, has identified tax policy considerations that, in general, 
countries should consider before deciding to enter into a DTA with a specific country (or to 
terminate one if changes to the domestic law of a treaty partner raise BEPS concerns) 
(OECD 2015c: para. 75). In this regard, the OECD has proposed to amend the Introduction 
to its MTC so that it includes these factors: 
- Where a State levies no or low income taxes, other States should consider whether there 
are risks of double taxation that would justify a tax treaty.  
- States should consider whether there are elements of another State’s tax system that 
could increase the risk of non-taxation – these may include tax advantages that are ring-
fenced from the domestic economy.  
- States should evaluate the extent to which the risk of double taxation actually exists in 
cross-border situations involving their residents; and they should note that many cases of 
residence/source juridical double taxation can be eliminated through domestic provisions 
for the relief of double taxation (ordinarily in the form of either the exemption or credit 
method) which can operate without the need for tax treaties.  
- Since one of the objectives of tax treaties is the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion, 
States should consider whether their prospective treaty partner is willing and able to 
implement effectively the DTA administrative assistance provisions, such as the ability to 
exchange tax information and the willingness to provide assistance in the collection of 
taxes. In this regard, the OECD reiterates the IMF’s recommendation (above) that these 
administrative assistance provisions could still be achieved through signing TIEAs67 or by 
signing the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
(OECD 2015c: para. 78).  
- Where a State has concerns that certain features of the domestic law of the other State 
may raise BEPS concerns or that it might effect changes after the conclusion of a DTA, 
that may pose BEPS risks, the OECD has come up with proposals to be included in the 
MTC to restrict treaty benefits if taxpayers benefit from ‘special tax regimes’ with 
preferential tax rules, or where certain drastic changes are made to a country’s domestic 
law after the conclusion of a treaty. These proposals will be finalised in 2016 (OECD 
2015c: para. 81).  
 
The OECD however recognises that there may be non-tax factors that can lead to the 
conclusion of a DTA, and that each country has a sovereign right to decide to enter into a 
DTA with any jurisdiction with which it decides to do so (OECD 2015c: para. 75 and OECD 
2013b: 19). 
 
2.4 General recommendations to prevent abuse of tax treaties in Africa 
 
With respect to the OECD recommendations to curb treaty shopping, it can be concluded 
there is no ‘one size fits all’ in addressing treaty abuse issues. For African countries, the 
                                                          
66  OECD ‘Jurisdictions Participating in the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. Status: 21 
November 2016 ’, http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf (accessed 29 
November 2016). 
67  In 2002 the OECD’s Global Forum developed a model agreement on exchange of information on tax matters (Oguttu 
2014).  
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most appropriate method or combination of methods will depend on the basic legal structure 
of the country involved and the nature of the transaction. For African countries, the first line 
of defence against treaty abuse is to ensure that they have domestic general anti-avoidance 
rules in place. To ensure that the application of such domestic provisions is not considered 
as treaty override, effort should be made to ensure such general anti-avoidance provisions 
are aligned with the recommended treaty PPT rule so that the possibility of conflicts is 
removed.  
 
Clearly Action 6 will result in changes to the OECD MTC which implies that, like other 
countries, African countries may have to renegotiate all their existing DTAs or to sign a 
protocol to include changes to the text proposed in the recommendations. Since the cost of 
such renegotiations in light of the number of treaties may not be feasible, African counties 
will have to consider joining the multilateral instrument proposed by the OECD in its BEPS 
Action 15 to implement measures developed in the course of the work on BEPS with respect 
to tax treaties. 
 
To benefit from the OECD tax policy considerations that countries should consider before 
deciding to enter into a DTA or to terminate one, it is important that African countries take 
proactive measures to review their DTA policies. They could emulate Uganda, which in 2014 
announced that it had suspended all of its ongoing double tax treaty negotiations pending a 
review into the treaty terms that it should seek in such negotiations.68 It is important that such 
a review evaluate all a country’s tax treaties to determine the ones that pose BEPS risks, 
especially those that lack anti-abuse provisions, those with zero or low withholding tax rates, 
and those with open-ended tax sparing provisions. Such DTAs should be negotiated to 
ensure an improved re-distribution of taxing rights.69 The decision to cancel a DTA should 
however not be taken lightly as it can impact on a country’s international relations (IMF 2014: 
22). To effectively prevent treaty abuse, a review of tax treaties alone is not enough. African 
countries should also review their domestic tax laws to ensure that they have the right to tax 
the relevant income. A treaty cannot impose tax where the income is not subject to tax under 
domestic legislation (IMF 2014: 22). In a situation where a DTA gives the right to tax a given 
type of income to a resident State, but that State’s domestic law does not levy tax on that 
income, African countries should negotiate a provision in their DTAs that they would not give 
up their source taxing right. 
 
 
3  Action 7: Prevent the artificial avoidance of 
PE status 
 
The PE issue is perhaps one of the most concerning for developing countries such as those 
in Africa, whose source basis of taxation would be eroded if foreign investors avoided PE 
status (Glenn 2014). The PE concept is a crucial element of DTAs. Thus the exact content of 
the definition of a PE is of crucial importance to developing countries if they are to curtail its 
abuse (UN 2015a: 16). It is also important for them to know the differences in the definitions 
of the PE concept in the OECD and UN MTCs. Since the OECD MTC embodies rules and 
proposals by developed capital exporting countries (Arnold and McIntyre 2002: 109), its 
definition of the PE concept is quite limited. The UN MTC, which favours capital importing 
countries over capital exporting countries, generally imposes fewer restrictions on the tax 
jurisdiction of source countries. Even though the UN MTC is historically based on the same 
principles and foundations as the OECD MTC, it offers a broader definition of the PE concept 
                                                          
68  Ladu ‘Govt Suspends Double Taxation Pacts’, Daily Monitor, 6 June 2014, http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Govt-
suspends-Double-Taxation-pacts/688322-2338432-dkw4jwz/index.html (accessed 29 November 2016  
69  Ibid. 
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which is advantageous for source countries (Arnold and McIntyre 2002: 109). The UN has 
over the years given special attention to developing countries and it has made efforts to 
protect and broaden the tax base of developing countries, as well to effectively combat tax 
evasion and tax avoidance in those countries (UN 2015a: viii).  
 
In general, the PE concept is designed to limit source countries’ tax jurisdiction over foreign 
businesses, and so it generally works in favour of residence countries (OECD 2013b: 19). 
The PE concept ensures that business activities are not taxed by a State unless a non-
resident enterprise has created a taxable presence – which is a significant and substantial 
economic bond with that State (Vogel 1997: 280 para. 4). This paper does not cover a 
detailed analysis of the working of the PE concept; for that, the reader is referred to previous 
articles written by this author (Oguttu 2009b and Oguttu 2010). The emphasis of this paper is 
on the BEPS challenges posed to the PE concept. For a brief overview to set the background 
for the discussion ahead, suffice it to note that the PE concept is defined generally in Article 
5(1) of the OECD and UN MTCs as ‘a fixed place of business through which the business of 
an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on’. Article 5(2) provides an illustrative list of places 
that constitute PEs.70 Article 5(3) provides a special rule PE for building or construction or 
installation projects if they last for more than 12 months. Article 5(4)(a)-(f) lists a number of 
business activities (discussed below) which are treated as exceptions to the general 
definition of a PE in Article 5(1). The PE excluded activities are intended to limit the 
otherwise wide scope of the definition of a PE in Article 5(1). The policy reason being that a 
PE should only arise where a taxpayer has a sufficient connection with that State (Baker 
2005: para. 5B.02). Apart from the physical places of business that constitute PEs, Article 
5(5) provides for a deemed PE where a dependent agent habitually concludes contracts on 
behalf of the enterprise in the other contracting State. Some African countries have a 
definition of the PE concept in their domestic law that is aligned to the treaty meaning. For 
example, in South Africa, a PE is defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act,71 with reference 
to the definition of the concept in Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.  
 
The OECD notes that the PE concept has been under attack for years, both from 
multinationals that abuse it by compartmentalising it, and from developing countries that want 
to extend its parameters to reclaim their tax jurisdiction.72 The OECD acknowledges that the 
current definition of a PE is not sufficient to address BEPS strategies in the changing 
international tax environment, as its standards are ineffective in equitably allocating taxing 
rights between source and residence States (OECD 2014b: para 3). However the OECD 
emphasises that even though the BEPS Project will restore both source73 and residence74 
taxation in a number of cases where cross-border income would otherwise go untaxed or 
would be taxed at very low rates, these action points are not directly aimed at changing the 
existing international standards on the allocation of taxing rights on cross-border income 
(OECD 2014b: para 3) or redrawing the boundaries between source and resident tax (OECD 
2014b: para 3). Thus the OECD’s approach to addressing the PE BEPS concerns is limited 
from the following perspectives: 
 
- The PE concept, which is largely based on having a physical presence in a State, is 
archaic in the face of twenty-first century electronic business models where 
transactions can be carried out without physical presence. However, the OECD does 
                                                          
70  Examples are: a place of management; a branch; an office; a factory; a workshop; a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or 
any place of extraction of natural resources. This list is not exhaustive. Para. 4 of the Commentary on Article 5(2) of the 
OECD MTC; Baker 2005: para. 5B.02. 
71  Act 58 of 1962. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Under source taxation, persons are taxed on income that originates within the territorial jurisdiction or geographical 
confines of the country, despite the taxpayer’s country of residence. See Meyerowitz 2008: para 7.1. 
74  Under residence taxation, residents are taxed on their worldwide income regardless of the source of the income. See 
Meyerowitz 2008 para 7.1. 
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not consider an overhaul of the PE concept. Its project is limited to addressing ‘artificial 
avoidance of PE status’. 
- In terms of Article 7(2) of the OECD MTC, only profits attributable to a PE are taxable 
in the source state. The attributable profits are those which a PE would have earned if 
instead of dealing with its head office, it had dealings with an entirely separate 
enterprise under conditions and at prices prevailing in the ordinary market. In effect, the 
PE is treated as if it were a separate legal entity (Arnold and McIntyre 2002: 74). The 
OECD still upholds this separate entity principle even though modern MNEs often 
operate as a single unified enterprise, managed from a central location by managers 
who are responsible for the enterprise as a whole (Avi-Yonah and Clausing 2008). 
Interestingly even the OECD acknowledges that international tax principles (such as 
this one on attributing profits to PEs) that fail to keep pace with the changing business 
environment and are still grounded in an economic environment characterised by a 
lower degree of economic integration across borders will not be effective in curtailing 
BEPS (OECD 2013b: 47).     
 
In Action 7, the OECD reinforces international tax standards that will result in changes to 
Article 5 of the MTC and thus prevent artificial avoidance of PE status. The discussion below 
is divided into three sections: 
- Issues pertaining to preventing avoidance of PE status that are addressed in the OECD 
BEPS project; 
- Issues pertaining to preventing avoidance of PE status that may be of concern to 
developing countries but are not addressed by the OECD BEPS project; 
- Issues pertaining to preventing avoidance of PE status to be addressed post-2015. 
 
3.1 Issues pertaining to preventing avoidance of PE status that are addressed 
in the OECD BEPS project  
 
3.1.1 Prevent avoidance of PE status through commissionaire arrangements  
 
Article 5(5) of both the OECD and the UN MTCs provides for a deemed PE if a dependent 
agent has authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise supplying the goods. 
However this provision can be circumvented if it is interpreted to mean that the agent must 
have the legal authority to bind the supplier at the end of the contract negotiations in order for 
a PE to exist, regardless of the extent of the agent’s activities in the source country. In 
countries with a civil law code, commissionaire agent arrangements can be structured to 
ensure that the contacts concluded by the agent are not concluded in the name of the 
supplier (the principle), in that they bind only the agent even though the principle will supply 
the goods on the terms agreed to by the agent. This implies that the supplier would 
technically not have a PE in the source country and so only the ‘low risk’ sales commission 
(not the real profit on the sale of the goods) would be taxed in the country of sale.75  
 
To prevent BEPS that arises as a result of commissionaire arrangements, the OECD 
recommends that as a matter of policy, where the activities that an intermediary exercises in 
a country are intended to result in the regular conclusion of contracts to be performed by a 
foreign enterprise, that enterprise should be considered to have a taxable presence in that 
country unless the intermediary is performing these activities in the course of an independent 
business (OECD 2015c: 10). This matter is of most concern to civil law jurisdictions that have 
provisions relating to commissionaire arrangements. Since most African countries apply 
common law, issues pertaining to commissionaire arrangements are not discussed any 
further in this paper. It is however worth noting that there may be cases where proxies are 
employed to escape the dependent agency PE rules in Article 5(5) that African countries 
                                                          
75  See Zimmer Ltd French Supreme Court, No. 3047 15, 31 Mar 2010; Dell AS Norwegian Supreme Court, HR-2011-
02245A, 2 Dec 2011; and Boston Scientific International BV Italian Supreme Court, No. 3769, 9 Mar 2012. 
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should be wary of, as these could pose BEPS risks. For example, in the South African case 
of SIR v Downing,76 Downing immigrated to Switzerland in 1960 and ceased to be a South 
African resident. Due to South Africa’s exchange control regulations, he could not move part 
of his share portfolio from South Africa. Downing authorised a stockbroker to ensure his 
share portfolio yielded income. The revenue authorities included the proceeds in Downing’s 
gross income. It was however held that by virtue of Article 5(5) of the South 
Africa/Switzerland DTA, the income was not taxable in South Africa as the stockbroker was 
an independent agent, acting in the ordinary course of his business.  
 
3.1.2 Splitting-up of contracts by contractors to circumvent PE time limits  
 
Article 5(3) of the OECD MTC provides for a special PE rule for building sites, construction 
and installation projects that last for more than 12 months. However, contractors and sub-
contractors, particularly those engaged in exploration and exploitation on the continental 
shelf, often abuse the 12 month PE time limit by dividing contracts into several parts, each 
covering a period of less than 12 months, and yet all owned by the same group.77 
Manipulating PE time limits is a major concern for Africa countries, especially so for 
construction, assembly and similar activities where, as a result of modern technology, a very 
short time period could be spent in the source country and still result in a substantial profit for 
the foreign enterprise.78 To address these concerns, paragraph 18 of the Commentary on 
Article 5 of the OECD MTC currently recommends that such abuses may be prevented by 
the application of domestic legislative or judicial anti-avoidance rules; and that countries can 
also devise solutions in the framework of bilateral negotiations.  
 
In practice however, many developing countries tend to apply a wider view of taxable 
presence for contractors and sub-contractors by negotiating an Article 5 that is based on the 
UN MTC. Article 5(3)(a) of the UN MTC deviates from the OECD MTC in that it covers not 
only building sites, construction, installation projects (covered in Article 5(3) of the OECD 
MTC), but also ‘assembly projects or supervisory activities in connection therewith’. The 
manipulation of time limits to avoid PE status is also limited in the UN MTC, in that the above 
mentioned projects or activities constitute a PE if they last more than six months (unlike the 
12 month time limit in the OECD MTC). Some African countries have managed to negotiate 
an Article 5(3)(a) based on the UN Model, for example Article 5(3) of Uganda’s treaties with 
Mauritius, South Africa, Netherlands and the UK follow the UN Model. Since African 
countries are predominately capital-importing countries, it would be in their interest to sign 
DTAs with Article 5(3)(a) of the UN MTC which has a six month rule as well as the express 
inclusion of assembly projects and supervisory activities (Akunobera 2012: 1078). However, 
it would be much better if they could negotiate lesser days considering that some 
construction activities, for instance by Chinese companies, can be completed in three 
months (Hearson 2015: 21).    
 
3.1.3 Splitting of service contracts to avoid PE status 
 
This is a concern with regard to MNEs engaged in service activities, such as the services of 
consultants, who often allege that the activities of these consultants or engineers are of a 
temporary nature. To address these concerns, currently paragraph 42.45 of the OECD 
Commentary on Article 5(4) recommends that legislative or judicial anti-avoidance rules may 
be applied to prevent such abuses. Paragraph 42.23 of the OECD Commentary on Article 5 
also suggests an alternative service-PE provision that countries may include in their treaties. 
Issues of splitting service contracts are pertinent for African countries, as PE status can be 
avoided by MNEs if an enterprise fragments its activities among related enterprises, or if it 
uses related non-resident enterprises to carry out connected projects (UN 2015a: 40). If this 
                                                          
76  1975 (4) SA 518 (A). 
77  Para. 18 of the Commentary on Article 5(3) of the OECD MTC. 
78  Para. 10 of the Commentary on Article 5(3) of the UN MTC (2014 version).  
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matter is left to contracting states to negotiate a service-PE, many African countries with 
weak treaty negotiating capabilities may not be successful in negotiating such a provision. 
Thus many developing countries tend to negotiate Article 5(3)(b) of the UN MTC, which 
categorically sets out a special PE service provision that covers the furnishing of services, 
including consultancy services, by an enterprise of a contracting State in the other State, 
through employees or other personnel engaged by the enterprise if those activities continue 
(for the same or a connected project) for an aggregate period of more than 183 days in any 
12 month period.79 The use of the phrase ‘same or a connected project’ in Article 5(3)(b) 
implies that when contracts are split to avoid PE thresholds, only commercial coherence, not 
geographical coherence, is required, unlike Article 5(1) which requires both (UN 2015a: 375). 
It should also be noted that only working days during which services are performed by the 
employees of the enterprise in the source country are taken into account. Days during which 
employees or other personnel are merely present in the source country but are not working 
are not counted. Developing countries, such as those in Africa, tend to include this UN MTC 
provision in Article 5 of their treaties because they believe that the provision of management 
and consultancy services in their countries by enterprises of industrialised countries can 
generate large profits if those activities continue for an extended period.80 However since the 
effectiveness of Article 5(3)(b) depends on whether the tax authorities can detect the 
presence of the service provider for more than 183 days in their country (which is a question 
of fact), it can still be possible to avoid the conditions of the article. The 183-day time limit 
can for instance be manipulated through artificial splitting of the connected projects to meet 
the time threshold (UN 2015a: 375) and preclude taxation in the case of a continuous 
number of separate projects. This is especially so with modern technology, where even a 
short duration can result in substantial profits for the enterprise.81 To address this matter, 
some African countries have negotiated time limits that are lower than the 183-day threshold. 
For example, Article 5(3)(b) in Uganda’s DTAs with Mauritius and Netherlands provides for a 
four month time limit for furnishing services.    
 
Even though Article 5(3)(b) of the UN MTC can be instrumental in preventing splitting of 
service contracts in that services for the same or a connected service provider are 
aggregated when counting the number of days that the services are performed in the source 
country, there can still be abuses since the provision does not take into account services 
provided by related enterprises with respect to the same or connected projects. A MNE 
carrying on business in a developing country may use its subsidiary company resident in a 
low-tax country to provide services (such as legal, accounting, management and technical 
services) to the company in the developing country, which may not require employees of the 
non-resident service provider to be present in the developing country for long periods of time. 
To prevent such abuses, effective exchange of information on such related enterprises would 
be required by tax administrations of the relevant countries (UN 2015a: 40). 
 
Nevertheless, a South African tax court ruled on the presence of a service PE in the 2015 
case of AB LLC and BD Holdings Tax v the Commissioner of the South African Revenue 
Services,82 in which the courts dealt with an Article 5 provision in the South African/USA DTA 
which is similar to the one in the UN MTC. The company in issue provided strategic and 
financial services in South Africa whereby its employees occupied the boardroom at the 
recipient’s premises to conduct those services. The company’s employees spent a period 
exceeding 183 days in South Africa. The Commissioner assessed the company for income 
earned from the services rendered on the basis that the company operated from a PE as 
contemplated in Article 5(2)(k) of the DTA,  which included in the meaning of a PE the 
furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an enterprise through employees if 
the activities continue (for the same or a connected project) for an aggregate period of more 
                                                          
79  Para. 9 of the Commentary on Article 5(3) of the UN MTC; Arnold and Mclntyre 2002: 121. 
80  Para. 9 of the Commentary on Article 5(3) of the UN MTC. 
81  Para. 10 of the Commentary on Article 5(3) of the UN MTC. 
82  Tax Court Case number 13276 May 2015.  
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than 183 days in any 12 month period. The court ruled that since the company provided 
consulting services through its employees in South Africa for a period exceeding 183 days, a 
PE had been created. Even Article 5(1) of the DTA could be applied in that the boardroom 
where the services were performed constituted a fixed place of business. So the income 
earned by the company was attributable to that PE and taxable in South Africa. 
 
OECD BEPS Project recommendation on splitting of contracts: To prevent PE abuse when 
contracts are split up between closely related enterprises, the 2015 BEPS Final Report on 
Action 7 recommends that the principal purposes test (PPT) rule that will be added to the 
OECD Model MTC as a result of the adoption of the OECD Report on ‘Action 6: Prevent 
treaty abuse’ (discussed above) should address the BEPS concerns related to such abuses 
(OECD 2015e: 10). 
 
Despite this recommendation, developing countries are concerned that the OECD’s 
approach of addressing BEPS issues arising from manipulating service activities is not 
effective. As explained above, in a treaty context, where a non-resident service provider 
renders services in the other contracting state, that state may only tax the foreign service 
provider if it qualifies as a PE in terms of Article 5. Under the UN MTC, the consultant may 
also be treated as having earned income from providing ‘independent personal services’ (in 
terms of Article 14), if they have a ‘fixed base’83 that they regularly use in the source state. 
However, Article 14 was deleted from the OECD MTC in 2000 and its coverage was 
introduced in Articles 5 and 7 of the OECD MTC with the reasoning that there were no 
intended differences between the PE concept and fixed base concept as in both cases, 
profits would be attributed in terms of Article 7 (Arnold and McIntyre 2002: 122). Either way, 
proving that a service PE or a fixed base has been created is very complicated as service 
providers often come up with artificial schemes to avoid being caught by the rules. Since only 
profits attributable to a PE are taxed in the source state, Article 7 requires that the arm’s 
length principle is applied in attributing those profits. However, enforcing the arm’s length 
principle with respect to service fees is cumbersome for source countries because it is 
difficult to verify whether the service fee payments are appropriate.  
 
In its 2015 Report on BEPS (OECD 2015e: para 20), OECD acknowledges that BEPS 
concerns regarding the PE concept in the context of service fees cannot be addressed 
successfully without coordinating the work on PEs with work on other actions, in particular 
Action 10, which deals with transfer pricing of high risk transactions (Arnold and McIntyre 
2002: 53). In Action 10, the OECD proposed revisions to Chapter VII of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines to guide taxpayers on how to benchmark transactions involving cross-border 
services so as to protect against common base eroding payments. The guidance entails a 
simplified elective method for determining arm’s length charges for common low value-
adding intragroup services which require a very limited profit mark-up on costs (OECD 
2015d: 141). The approach removes the detailed arm’s length benchmarking of the benefits 
received and creates a low cost methodology for pricing low value-added services. The 
OECD defines low value-adding intragroup services as those that are: supportive in nature; 
not part of the core business of the MNE group; do not require the use or creation of unique 
and valuable intangibles; and do not involve the assumption or control of significant risk 
(OECD 2015d: 153). Examples of such services are: accounting and auditing; processing 
and management of accounts; human resources activities; monitoring and compilation of 
data; information technology services; public relations support; legal and tax obligation 
services; as well as services of an administrative or clerical nature (OECD 2015d: 154). 
Excluded services are: services constituting the core business of the MNE group; research 
and development; manufacturing and production; purchasing raw materials used in 
                                                          
83  The term ‘fixed base’ is not defined in the UN MTC, neither was it defined in the OECD MTC before it was deleted. 
Para. 10(4) of the Commentary on Article 14 of the UN MTC notes that ‘it has not been thought appropriate to try to 
define [the term ‘fixed base’], but it would cover, for instance a physician’s consulting room or the office of an architect or 
a lawyer’.  
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manufacturing or production; sales, marketing and distribution activities; financial 
transactions; extraction, exploration, or processing of natural resources; insurance and 
reinsurance; and services of corporate senior management (OECD 2015d: 153-4). 
 
The OECD suggests that where excessive charges for intragroup management services are 
viewed as being a major BEPS challenge, a threshold can be put in place whereby, for 
services that exceed the threshold, a full transfer pricing analysis is performed (OECD 
2015d: 159). The OECD notes that for this approach to work, many countries need to agree 
on adopting it before 2018. In principle OECD members have agreed to the approach and 
associated countries (which include South Africa) are considering it (OECD 2015d: 142). The 
OECD would then design the structure of the threshold and other implementation issues. It 
would be in the interest of a developing country that lacks a data base for comparability to 
support efforts to develop this approach as it would reduce the costs for taxpayers and 
administrative burdens for SARS.  
 
It is important that developing countries take into consideration the above OECD Guidance 
as well as the work of the G20 Development Working Group, which was mandated to 
develop toolkits that will help developing countries implement measures to protect their tax 
base from excessive intragroup service charges (OECD 2015d: 142). 
 
It should be noted though that there has been widespread dissatisfaction by source countries 
regarding their entitlement to tax services, even if a PE or a fixed base could be proved to 
exist, because of the erosion of source country tax bases (UN 2015a: 95). Where there is no 
tax treaty in place, a practical method applied by many African countries to prevent base 
erosion is to levy a withholding tax on service fees on a gross basis without a deduction for 
expenses incurred. South Africa for instance has a withholding tax on service fees, as does 
Uganda and Ghana.84 To further protect their tax bases, some developing countries have 
opted to sign treaties with articles on services fees (often combined with management fees 
and technical fees) which currently deviate from the OECD and the UN MTCs. Generally 
there is no clear definition of such services, but the treaties that have these articles broadly 
define services, management and technical fees as ‘payments of any kind to any person, 
other than an employee of the person making the payments, in consideration for any 
services of a managerial, technical or consultancy nature, rendered in a contracting state’.85 
In terms of these articles, the service fees are taxed in the resident state but they may also 
be taxed in the source state if the beneficial owner thereof is a resident of the other 
contracting state. In that case, the charge for the fee shall not exceed a certain percentage of 
the gross amount as agreed upon. For example, Ghana has signed treaties with Germany 
and Netherlands with combined ‘royalties and service’ fees.86 Uganda has signed treaties 
with South Africa and the United Kingdom which contain an article on ‘technical fees’.87 
Provisions on services, managements and technical fees do not only appear in treaties 
signed by African countries: Article 12 of the US-India tax treaty deals with royalties and 
                                                          
84  South Africa levies at a flat rate of 15 per cent as per Part IVC in Chapter II of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 – to come into 
operation on 1 January 2017; Uganda levies the equivalent termed ‘management fees’ at a rate of 15 per cent in terms 
of section 83(1) of Uganda’s Income Tax Act, Chapter 340; Ghana levies management and technical services 
fees/endorsement fees at a rate of 15 per cent in terms of the Ghana Income Tax Act 896 of 2015.  
85  For example, Article 12(4) of the Double Taxation Agreement between Ghana and Germany, entered into force 14 
December 2007. www.nyansa-africa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Ghana-Germany-DTA.pdf (accessed 30 
November 2016) 
86  See Article 12 of the Ghana and Germany treaty. See also Article 12 of the Double Taxation Convention between The 
Netherlands and Ghana, entered into force 10 March 2008.  
http://download.belastingdienst.nl/itd/verdragen/overige/belastingverdrag_ghana.pdf (accessed 30 November 2016). 
87 Article 13 ‘Technical fees’ of the Double Taxation Agreement between South Africa and Uganda, entered into force 9 
April 2001. 
www.ura.go.ug/openFile.do?path=//webupload//upload//download//staticContent//RGTMENU//458//464___IBFD_-
_SOUTH_AFRICA_-_UGANDA_INCOME_TAX_TREATY.pdf (accessed 30 November 2016). See also Article 13 of the 
Double Taxation Convention between the United Kingdom and Uganda, entered into force 21 December 1993. 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/uganda-tax-treaties (accessed 30 November 2016). 
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service fees.88 Research conducted in 2012 found that ‘134 of the 1,586 tax treaties 
concluded internationally between 1997 and 2011’ contained an article on fees for technical 
services (Wijnen, de Goede and Alessi 2012). However there is no standard way of drafting 
these articles, which makes treaty negotiations very difficult and creates uncertainties for 
taxpayers. Since the articles on these types of fees deviate from what is in the MTCs, the 
provisions adopted tend to be less well thought through than those arising from debate and 
negotiation under the OECD or the UN MTCs. Despite the widespread use of the articles on 
fees, the OECD does not advocate for such an article in its MTC and so this matter has not 
been addressed in the BEPS Project. Rather, the OECD prefers to tax services under Article 
5, thus giving the residence countries of MNEs that specialise in high value services a bigger 
share of the right to tax those profits. In 2013 the UN decided to add a new article on income 
from technical services in its MTC which would allow developing countries to levy a tax on 
payments made to overseas providers of ‘technical services’. The UN’s proposed article on 
technical services will be included in the 2017 update of its MTC. Developing countries are 
looking forward to this service fee article as it will give validity to their position on this matter, 
and help them to successfully negotiate such a provision in their treaties. If they can manage 
to do so, developed countries may insist on high concessions (like low withholding taxes) if 
they give in to a technical service fee article. It should however be noted that African 
countries must still must enact domestic law that allows them to tax income from technical 
services derived by non-resident service providers, since a treaty cannot levy tax if the 
income is taxed under domestic law. 
 
3.1.4 Artificial avoidance of PE excluded activities  
 
(a)  The word ‘delivery’ in Article 5(4)(a) and (b): The meaning of a PE in the OECD MTC 
does not include: 
a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods 
or merchandise belonging to the enterprise; 
b)  the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise 
solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery. 
 
In its 2014 Discussion Draft on Action 7 (OECD 2014b), the OECD acknowledges that it is 
difficult to justify the application of exception (a) and (b) to the PE concept where an 
enterprise maintains a very large warehouse in which a significant number of employees 
work for the main purpose of delivering goods that the enterprise sells online (OECD 2014b: 
paras. 18-19). The OECD is however of the view that even if the delivery of goods is treated 
as giving rise to a PE, only a small amount of income could properly be attributed to this 
activity and that if the issue is not given close consideration, tax authorities might end up 
attributing too much income to this activity, which would lead to prolonged litigation and 
inconsistent application of tax treaties (OECD 2014b: paras. 18-19). Thus no further 
consideration of this matter is dealt with in the OECD Final Report on Action 7. However, 
avoiding PE status as a result of including the word ‘delivery’ in the exclusions to the PE 
concept is of concern to developing countries which argue that a stock of goods for prompt 
delivery facilitates the sale of products and earning profits in the host country. The UN MTC 
address this matter by ensuring that the word ‘delivery’ is not referred to in subparagraphs 
(a) and (b). This implies that a warehouse used for delivery purposes should be a PE, if the 
requirements of Article 5(1) are met, thus permitting source countries to tax income derived 
from the operation of a warehouse (Arnold and McIntyre 2002: 121). Concerns related to use 
of the word ‘delivery’ in the OECD MTC are connected to instances where a MNE has a 
dependent agent in a state, who maintains a stock of goods in a warehouse from which 
products are delivered to customers in that state, thereby carrying out significant business in 
the host country. In terms of the OECD MTC, such activities of the dependent agent would 
                                                          
88  ‘The Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of India 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income’, Effective 
date 1 January 1991. www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/india.pdf (accessed 30 November 2016). 
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not constitute a PE since Article 5(5) provides that a dependent agent is only deemed to exist 
if such agent habitually concludes contracts on behalf of the enterprise in the other 
contracting state. However, the UN MTC covers the above concern in that it has an 
additional Article 5(5)(b) which includes in the meaning of a dependent agent ‘the 
maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise from which he 
regularly delivers goods or merchandise on behalf of the enterprise’ (UN 2011: Article 
5(5)(b). Uganda’s treaty with Mauritius follows this UN approach. It would be in the interest of 
African countries to ensure they have this provision in the DTAs they negotiate. 
 
(b) Maintenance of a stock of goods for the purpose of processing: Article 5(4)(c) 
excludes from the PE concept the ‘maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise 
belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of processing by another enterprise’. An 
important BEPS issue is whether an enterprise’s stock of goods maintained by a toll-
manufacturer will result in the location of the toll-manufacturer’s activities being a PE of the 
enterprise. Basically, a toll-manufacturer is a company that processes raw materials or partly 
completed goods for another company in exchange for a toll.89 In terms of the current PE 
rules, if a toll manufacturer maintains a stock of goods for processing and stores them for 
delivery to the enterprise, a PE would not be constituted. However in modern business 
models a toll manufacturer could be part of the MNE group of companies, and so it is 
necessary to determine if the maintenance of goods for the purpose of processing creates a 
PE for the MNE. 
 
(c) Purchasing goods or merchandise or collecting information for the enterprise: Article 
5(4)(d) excludes from the PE concept ‘the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for 
the purpose of purchasing goods or merchandise or of collecting information, for the 
enterprise’. However modern business models, especially digital MNEs, can collect 
information for the enterprise and disguise it by repackaging it into reports prepared for those 
enterprises, thereby avoiding PE status (OECD 2014b: para. 28).  It is necessary that where 
a MNE has a connected affiliate in a source state that collects information that is related to 
the business as a whole, such an affiliate should be considered a PE of the MNE.  
 
(d) Preparatory or auxiliary activities: Articles 5(e) and 5(f) prevent an enterprise from 
being taxed in the other state, if it only carries on activities of a purely preparatory or auxiliary 
character.90 There has, however, been uncertainty about the meaning of the phrase 
‘preparatory or auxiliary’. The Botswana case of Transvaal Associated Hides and Skin 
Merchants v Collector of Taxes, Botswana,91 illustrates this concept. The taxpayer in issue 
was a company, incorporated in South Africa, which was in the business of buying and 
selling hides and skins of slaughtered livestock. The hides were purchased from abattoirs in 
Botswana but the sales and taking of orders was processed in South Africa. From 1954 to 
1961, the taxpayer processed hides from an abattoir in Lobatsi, Botswana. Before the hides 
could be delivered to the respective purchasers they had to be cured to prevent damage. 
The process of curing the hides required stacking them in piles and leaving them to stand for 
a period of between 11 to 21 days; they were then sorted into grades and despatched to 
purchasers. For this purpose the taxpayer maintained a shed in Lobatsi. The Collector of 
Income Tax, Botswana, sought to tax the taxpayer on the profits earned from the sale of the 
hides purchased and cured at Lobatsi, arguing that the taxpayer had created a PE in 
Botswana. The taxpayer argued that the activities of curing the hides that were carried out in 
Botswana were excluded from the PE concept since they were merely preparatory or 
auxiliary in nature, and that the shed in which the hides were stacked amounted to a 
warehouse or depot for further delivery. Dismissing the taxpayer’s contention, Judge J. A. 
Maisels stated, regarding the curing process: ‘It is to my mind clear that the activities of the 
                                                          
89  Hiring a toll manufacturer often ensures efficiency, and it also lessens pre-production costs as no capital investments 
are required. 
90  Para. 18 of the Commentary on Art 5(4); see also Holmes 2007: 156.. 
91  Transvaal Associated Hides and Skin Merchants v Collector of Taxes, Botswana 29 SATC 97: 115. 
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appellant went beyond the mere purchase of goods or the storing of goods in a warehouse 
for the convenience of delivery.’  Furthermore, that since the taxpayer held the shed from 
1954 to 1961, it constituted premises and a PE that the taxpayer had at its disposal in 
Botswana which was not ‘temporary or occasional, but was permanent’. 
 
An example of preparatory or auxiliary activities given in Article 5(4)(e) is the maintenance of 
a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of advertising or the supply of information or 
for scientific research. However, in the modern world, real value can be created through 
scientific research as well as the development and testing of products in continuous 
processes of innovation and improvement. Spending on innovation is key to the success of 
many businesses today. However, under the current rules, a MNE could claim its research 
and development activities that are relevant for the sale of final products are preparatory or 
auxiliary in nature. Since the OECD’s BEPS project is about ensuring that profits are taxed 
where economic activities generating the profits are performed and where value is created 
(OECD 2013a: 10), it is important to acknowledge that the true value of the MNEs profits 
cannot be determined without considering the value contributed through research and 
development, or the creation of products in source countries. Otherwise, the concept of 
‘preparatory or auxiliary’ activities only serves as a loophole for fragmenting activities without 
attaining the threshold of a PE in source country.  
 
OECD recommendation on preparatory or auxiliary activities: The OECD BEPS Report 
acknowledges that depending on the circumstances, business activities that were previously 
considered to be merely preparatory or auxiliary in nature may nowadays be an enterprise’s 
core business activities. In order to ensure that profits derived from core activities performed 
in a country can be taxed in that country, the OECD will modify Article 5(4) in its next update 
to the MTC to ensure that each of the exceptions to the PE concept, not only paragraphs (e) 
and (f), are restricted to activities that are of a preparatory or auxiliary character (OECD 
2015e: 10). 
 
Previously, the meaning of the terms ‘preparatory or auxiliary’ was not clear, causing 
disagreements regarding how to identify an enterprise’s core business. In light of Action 7, 
the OECD Commentary on Article 5(4) will clarify what is considered to be a preparatory or 
auxiliary activity. A preparatory activity would be one which precedes the main activity, one 
that is carried out for a short period of time, or an activity that is determined by the character 
of the main activity of the enterprise (OECD 2015e: 17). For example, training employees 
prior to commencing construction would be seen as a preparatory activity. An auxiliary 
activity would be considered to be a ‘supportive’ activity and not necessarily considered to be 
vital to the main activity being carried out. Thus, where an activity requires a significant 
amount of assets or employees to be conducted, such an activity cannot be considered to be 
auxiliary in nature. 
 
(e) Fragmentation of activities between related parties:  MNEs can avoid PE status by 
fragmenting activities and taking advantage of Article 5(4)(f), which excludes from the PE 
concept ‘the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities 
mentioned in subparagraphs (a)-(e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed place of 
business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary character’. However, 
the wide application of Article 5(4)(f), which covers a combination of activities, often creates 
nexus in the source country that is not preparatory or auxiliary. It also encourages the 
fragmentation of operations, typically in contracting and customer delivery activities, as well 
as in production activities, to ensure that disproportionate profits are attributed to affiliates in 
countries with lower effective tax rates. Fragmentation of activities also often occurs where 
manufacturing is outsourced so that production appears to be carried out in low tax 
jurisdictions (although there may not be much substance in such activities), but the 
outsourcing is merely done to ensure profits are subject to lower taxes. Currently, paragraph 
27.1 of the OECD Commentary on Article 5(4)(f) does acknowledge that an enterprise 
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cannot fragment a cohesive operating business into several small operations in order to 
argue that each is merely engaged in a preparatory or auxiliary activity. 
 
OECD recommendation on fragmentation of activities: In its 2015 final report on Action 6 
(OECD 2015b), the OECD reiterates this view. Given the ease with which MNEs may alter 
their business structures to obtain tax advantages, the OECD has proposed to add on to 
Article 5(4) an anti-fragmentation provision in its next update to the MTC. This will deny the 
application of the exceptions of Article 5(4), where complementary business activities are 
carried on by associated enterprises at the same location, or by the same enterprise, or by 
associated enterprises at different locations (OECD 2015e: 10). Thus a PE would be 
considered to exist if, taken together, such business activities would constitute 
complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation (OECD 2014b: para. 
31, option J). This anti-fragmentation rule is of paramount importance to developing countries 
that are interested in ensuring that the definition of a PE acknowledges the structure of 
twenty-first century business models. However, concerns still remain since the anti-
fragmentation rule is limited to ‘preparatory or auxiliary’ activities related to sales and may 
only be effective for MNEs engaged in selling physical goods like books which can be 
delivered from their  own warehouse in the country of sale. The anti-fragmentation rule may 
not be effective in dealing with sales of intangible products or services (e.g. streaming 
services, electronic books) by digital MNEs. Thus there is still scope for fragmentation for 
electronic services and dematerialised products  
 
3.2 Issues pertaining to preventing avoidance of PE status that may be of 
concern to developing countries but are not addressed by the OECD BEPS 
project  
 
In its 2014 Discussion Draft on artificial avoidance of the PE concept (OECD 2014b), the 
OECD Working Group considered other matters that pose BEPS challenges to the PE 
concept, but did not address these matters in its 2015 final report. Nevertheless, they are of 
concern to developing countries, and so recommendations as to how these challenges can 
be addressed are considered below.  
 
3.2.1   Insurance 
 
In its MTC, the OECD acknowledges that insurance (including re-insurance) raises difficult 
issues as regards where profits from the remuneration of risk should be taxed (OECD 2014b: 
40). Paragraph 39 of the OECD Commentary on Article 5 notes that an insurance company 
from one state can create a PE in another state, if it has a fixed place of business in that 
state in terms of Article 5(1), or if it carries on business through a dependent agent in terms 
of Article 5(5). However, agencies of foreign insurance companies sometimes do not meet 
either of the above requirements, and yet they can do large-scale business in a state without 
being taxed in that state on profits arising from such business.92 To address this challenge, 
paragraph 39 of the OECD Commentary on Article 5 merely provides that OECD member 
countries can include a provision in their double taxation agreements (DTAs) which stipulates 
that a state’s insurance companies are deemed to have a PE in the other state if they collect 
premiums or insure risk in that other state through an agent established there (excluding the 
collection of insurance premiums or re-insurance of risk by a dependent agent who already 
constitutes a PE under Article 5(5)). The OECD left the decision to include such a provision 
in a DTA to its member countries, noting that such a provision would not be frequently 
needed. 93 However, this matter is of concern to developing countries, but their lack of strong 
treaty negotiating capacity may result in them not being successful in negotiating such a 
provision in their DTAs. ATAF has for instance indicated that African countries have 
                                                          
92  Para. 39 of the Commentary on Article 5. 
93  Ibid. 
36 
 
concerns about significant insurance premiums being paid by MNEs to affiliate captive 
insurance companies in tax haven-jurisdictions.94 Unlike the OECD MTC, the UN MTC has 
Article 5(6) which specifically states that an insurance enterprise shall be deemed to have a 
PE in the other contracting state if it collects premiums or insures risks in the other state 
through a dependent agent. This article does not require the insurance activities to occur 
through a fixed place of business or for any minimum period of time (UN 2015a: 66). The 
only requirement is that the collection of premiums or insurance of risks should take place in 
the source country. Given the ease with which MNEs may alter their business structures to 
obtain tax advantages (OECD 2014b: 40), it would be in the interest of African countries to 
negotiate such a UN provision in their tax treaties to prevent BEPS arising from insurance 
business. 
 
3.2.2 Abusing PE status – concerns about subsidiary ‘entity isolation’  
 
Another aspect of the PE definition that encourages BEPS is Article 5(7) which states that a 
subsidiary company in the other contracting state does not, of itself, constitute a PE of its 
parent company, since a subsidiary is a separate legal entity. It should be noted that this 
provision is subject to Article 5(1), in that a parent company may create a PE in the state of 
the subsidiary, if it has space at its disposal in the subsidiary’s place of business and if all the 
other requirements of Article 5 are met.95 Also in terms of Article 5(5), if a subsidiary 
habitually exercises authority to conclude contracts in the name of the parent company (as a 
dependent agent), the parent company is deemed to have a PE in that state if all the other 
requirements of Article 5 are met.96 Despite these provisions, the tax administrations of many 
African countries may not have the necessary information-gathering resources to discover 
the facts required to show that a PE has been created (UN 2015a: 40). 
 
The other concern is that Article 5(7) is irrelevant to twenty-first century business models 
since it bolsters the OECD’s notion of ‘entity isolation’, which fails to admit that subsidiaries in 
modern MNEs do not operate as separate entities but as a single unified enterprise (Avi-
Yonah and Clausing 2008). The very essence of a MNE is to ensure integration so as to 
encourage synergy within the group as a whole. Because the OECD encourages the 
separate entity notion, a MNE can assign all the activities and property that it needs to 
conduct business in a particular country to a separately incorporated affiliate and escape PE 
status by making sure that all valuable intangible property (such as patents) and activities 
that could generate substantial profits are not assigned to the affiliate (McIntyre 2015: 5). The 
intangible property could be kept in an offshore affiliate, and then the separately incorporated 
affiliate in the source country would be required to pay royalties to the offshore affiliate for the 
use of the intangible property in the source state. In that way, the MNE would be able to limit 
the profits taxable in the source state (McIntyre 2015: 5). It is disappointing that the OECD 
chose not to address this matter which runs at the centre of BEPS issues, since the 
supposed independence of MNE affiliates does not correspond to how MNEs operate. The 
BEPS Monitoring Group (BEPS Monitoring Group 2015: 9) points out that it would be 
beneficial if the OECD considered a recommendation that Article 5(7) be amended to provide 
that any affiliate of a MNE will be treated as having created a PE if it carries on activities 
which constitute complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation – 
which would be in line with the anti-fragmentation rule that it recommends. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
94  ATAF Second Meeting: Cross Border Taxation Technical Committee, 3-4 March 2015: 1.  
95  Para. 41 of the Commentary on Article 5(7). 
96  Ibid. 
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3.3 Preventing avoidance of PE status: Issues to be addressed post-2015 
 
3.3.1 Artificial avoidance of PE status in the digital economy 
 
The application of the PE concept faces challenges as a result of developments in the digital 
economy, since the concept is based on physical presence as the primary basis for taxation. 
The OECD BEPS Report on the digital economy notes that ‘nowadays it is possible to be 
heavily involved in the economic life of another country’, e.g. by doing business with 
customers located in that country via the internet, without having a taxable presence therein 
(such as a substantial physical presence or a dependent agent) (OECD 2015f para. 256). 
Digital enterprises have for instance replaced distribution structures that previously used a 
local sales office, with a website selling the product for direct delivery, thus eliminating all the 
sales income from the domestic tax base. Similarly, services that were offered by local 
presence through an office can now be performed offshore and offered electronically. Thus 
clearly the current definition of the PE concept is ineffective in curbing BEPS in the digital 
economy. The concept was developed decades ago and does not encompass how business 
is conducted using current business models. With the digital economy, companies are 
increasingly supplying services rather than physical products only. The physical presence 
time limits of 12 or six months under the existing PE concept (in the OECD and UN MTCs 
consecutively) are irrelevant in determining a PE since with a click of the mouse services can 
be effected in the source state without physical presence there. With respect to dependency 
agency PE, it is possible to conclude contracts remotely through technological means, with 
no involvement of individual employees or dependent agents. This raises concerns about 
whether the existing agency PE rule, which focuses on the conclusion of contracts by 
dependent agents, is still appropriate (OECD 2015f para. 256). The exclusions to the PE 
concept can also be easily manipulated in the digital economy. Activities which were 
previously considered to be preparatory or auxiliary activities (and hence benefit from the 
exceptions to the definition of PE) may increasingly be significant and core components of 
businesses in the digital economy (OECD 2015f para. 260). For example, Article 5(4)(a), 
which excludes storage and delivery from the PE concept, is a major BEPS concern as the 
use of delivery warehouses is a large part of MNE digital companies, whose business 
models often rely on maintaining extensive inventory in the target country. Delivery of 
products or inventory to customers is often effected from a local warehouse that is not under 
its control and which has no employees of its own in the country of the customers. Based on 
the current definition of a PE under the OECD Model, this would not constitute a PE as the 
warehouse would be considered as used for storage purposes. In terms of the UN Model, 
even if there is no or little activity in the warehouse from which delivery is done, and even if 
the digital company maintains no employees of its own in the country of the customers, the 
delivery carried out from the warehouse would constitute a PE. With respect to  Article 
5(4)(d), which excludes from the PE concept the maintenance of a fixed place of business 
solely for the purpose of collecting information for the enterprise, companies dealing in 
electronic products, such as Google, can collect data about consumer preferences from a 
market jurisdiction by monitoring digital traffic and then selling that data to third party 
advertisers in other countries, thereby ensuring targeted advertisements in their marketing 
strategies (UN 2015a: 20). Revenues collected from advertisements to targeted users in one 
country can then be funnelled through subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions, thus avoiding PE 
status in the country where products or services are advertised.97  These matters are of 
particular concern to developing countries, where there has been a significant expansion of 
access to digital services and increased use of technology to exploit the local market. When 
the OECD released its 2015 Final Reports on BEPS, it noted that work on the digital 
economy would only be completed in the coming years, so some of its recommendations (set 
out below) on the challenges raised above have not yet been finalised.   
                                                          
97  Johnston, S. S., ‘News analysis: Chasing Google -- The Global Struggle to Tax Ecommerce’, Tax Notes International, 
10 February 2014, www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-international/2014-02-10 (accessed 30 November 2016). 
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OECD recommendation on addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy: The OECD 
suggests that where digital business models manipulate the exceptions to the PE concept – 
in that activities which were previously considered preparatory or auxiliary may be the core 
components of their business – Article 5(4) of the OECD MTC will be amended to rein in 
these activities by ensuring (as discussed above) that all the exceptions to the PE are 
modified to ensure that they are available only for activities that are genuinely of a 
preparatory or auxiliary nature (OECD 2015f). 
 
The OECD’s options for taxing the digital economy:  The OECD has come up with three 
options to tax digital transactions (not yet finalised) which can be applied individually or in 
combination.  
 
(a) Nexus based on the concept of significant economic presence: This option would create 
a taxable presence in a country when a non-resident enterprise has significant economic 
presence in a country, on the basis of factors that evidence a purposeful and sustained 
interaction with the economy of that country via technology and other automated tools 
(OECD 2015f para. 280). 
 
(b) A withholding tax on digital transactions: The withholding tax could be imposed as a 
standalone gross-basis final withholding tax on certain payments made to non-resident 
providers of goods and services ordered online or, alternatively, as a primary collection 
mechanism and enforcement tool to support the application of the nexus option described 
above (OECD 2015f para. 292). 
 
(c) An equalisation levy: In order to provide clarity, certainty and equity to all stakeholders, 
and to avoid undue burden on small and medium-sized businesses, the equalisation levy 
would be applied only in cases where it is determined that a non-resident enterprise has a 
significant economic presence (OECD 2015f para. 302). 
 
3.3.2 Attribution of profits to PEs  
 
The OECD notes that BEPS concerns regarding the PE concept cannot be addressed 
successfully without coordinating the work on PE status with work on other actions, in 
particular Action 10, which deals with transfer pricing of high risk transactions. The Action 10 
concern with respect to transfer pricing of high risk transactions that is pertinent with respect 
to PEs is base eroding head office expenses (OECD 2013b: 20). Since a PE is considered 
as part of its head office and not a separate legal entity, Article 7(1) of the OECD MTC 
requires that only profits attributable to a PE are taxable in the source state. The current 
version of Article 7(2) (introduced in the 2010 update to the MTC) sets out the OECD 
authorised approach of attributing profits to a PE and how its expenses are to be treated. In 
terms of this approach, profits are attributed to a PE in its dealings with other parts of the 
enterprise as ‘if it were a separate and independent enterprise’ dealing with an entirely 
separate enterprise under conditions and at prices prevailing in the ordinary market; taking 
into account the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the enterprise 
through the PE and through the other parts of the enterprise. This approach is absurd 
because a PE is part of its head office so it is not possible for contractual allocation of risks to 
take place within the same entity. Since the fiction requires that a PE is treated as a separate 
independent entity, the OECD recommends that the arm’s length principle, as set out in 
Article 9(1) of the OECD MTC and used to prevent transfer pricing among separate legal 
entities, should also apply to dealings between a PE and its head office. However this 
‘functionally separate entity’ approach of attributing profits to a PE recognises its internal 
dealings with the head office by pricing them on an arm’s length basis, without regard to the 
actual profits of the enterprise of which the PE is a part. This implies that non-actual 
management expenses, notional interest and royalties from the head office may be charged 
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on the PE. This approach differs from the 2008 version of Article 7(3) of the OECD MTC and 
the approach in the UN MTC, which applies the ‘single entity’ approach to attribute profits to 
a PE and clearly denies the deduction of notional expenses, such that only the actual income 
and expenses of the PE are allocated. It is argued that the OECD ‘functionally separate 
entity’ approach may result in exploitation since it allows deductions for notional internal 
payments that exceed expenses actually incurred by the taxpayer.98 Consequently many 
countries99 have not adopted the OECD’s authorised approach due to concerns that it would 
result in tax revenue loss, particularly through allowing financial services businesses 
deductions for notional payments on internal loans and derivatives involving PEs.100 African 
countries are also very sceptical about adopting the OECD’s approach, since MNEs often try 
to avoid taxes levied on the PE by claiming deductions of various forms of fees charged to 
the headquarter office on the PE. South Africa has for instance reserved the right to use the 
version of Article 7 of the OECD MTC from prior to the 2010 update, in that when applying 
the arm’s length principle to attribute profits to a PE, notional charges or expenses are not 
accepted. A number of African countries’ domestic tax laws also deny or limit the deductions 
for such fees and other expenses, such as advertising and interest (Holland and Vann 1989: 
Ch. 19, VII (C). The OECD BEPS Project has not yet dealt with this issue. It is hoped that the 
‘authorised approach’ will be reconsidered. 
 
It should be noted that under the UN MTC, in addition to attributing profits to PE, a limited 
force of attraction also applies which allows the source country to also tax profits derived 
from sales of goods and merchandise and from other business activities similar to those 
made or carried on through the PE if the sales or activities take place in the source country, 
even though such income was clearly not attributable to that PE.101 At present, this limited 
force of attraction rule, which is intended to function as an anti-avoidance rule, is included in 
only about 10 per cent of all DTAs internationally (UN 2015a: 64). The general force of 
attraction approach has been rejected in international tax treaty practice on the reasoning 
that the organisation of modern business is highly complex and that there are many 
companies engaged in a wide diversity of business activities in many countries.102 A 
company may set up a PE in a country and carry out manufacturing activities through this 
PE, while a different part of the same company sells different goods or manufactures in that 
country through independent agents. That company may have perfectly valid commercial 
reasons (and not tax reasons) for doing so, for example based on the historical pattern of its 
business or on commercial convenience. If the country in which the PE is situated were to 
tax the profit of each of the transactions carried on through independent agents, with a view 
to aggregating that profit with the profits of the PE, this would interfere with ordinary 
commercial activities and would be contrary to the aims of the UN MTC.103   
   
Attributing profits to PEs in the digital economy: Challenges of attributing profits to PE are 
exacerbated by the digitalisation of the economy which has resulted in dematerialisation of 
production, the fragmentation of functions, the creation of supply chains and the shift to 
                                                          
98  Deloitte ‘New ATO paper on profit allocation to bank branches’, newsletters.usdbriefs.com/2011/Tax/ALS/a111010_6.pdf 
(accessed 16 December 2016). 
99  The UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters has not viewed changes as relevant to the 
United Nations Model Tax Convention. Some OECD countries have entered reservations to the OECD authorised 
approach. In the OECD MTC, para. 95 of the Commentary on Article 7 states that New Zealand reserves the right to 
use the previous version of Article 7 immediately before the 2010 update of the OECD MTC, because it does not agree 
with the approach reflected in Part 1 of the 2010 Report Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments. New 
Zealand does not, therefore, endorse the changes to the Commentary on the Article made through that update. In para. 
97 of the Commentary on Article 7 of the OECD MTC, Portugal reserves its right to continue to adopt in its conventions 
the text of the Article as it read before 2010, until its domestic law is adapted in order to apply the new approach. In 
para. 96 of the Commentary on Article 7 of the OECD MTC, Chile, Greece, Mexico and Turkey reserve the right to use 
the previous version of Article 7, before the 2010 update of the MTC. They do not, therefore, endorse the changes to the 
Commentary on the Article made through that update.  
100  Deloitte ‘Transfer pricing law reforms’ (2013), www2.deloitte.com/au/en/pages/tax/articles/transfer-pricing-law-
reforms.html (accessed 16 December 2016). 
101  Para. 10 of the 2008 Commentary on Article 7 of the OECD MTC. 
102  Ibid. 
103  Ibid. 
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services. Where internet-based companies pay little or no tax on profits from delivery of 
goods or services in countries where they have large sales, this implies that profits can be 
attributed to affiliates in countries where they are lightly taxed.  
 
To address these concerns, the OECD proposes that when its (above mentioned) nexus 
based on significant economic presence to tax digital economy is adopted, the rules for 
attribution of profits for the digital economy will have to be changed to suit this nexus, while 
ensuring parity between traditional enterprises that are subject to tax using the PE physical 
presence test (OECD 2015f: para. 284). In this regard, the OECD has come up with the 
following alternative suggestions of attributing of profits to PE (OECD 2015f: para. 285):  
 
(a) Methods based on fractional apportionment: The OECD considered the approach of 
apportioning the profits of the whole enterprise to the digital presence either on the basis of a 
predetermined formula, or on the basis of variable allocation factors determined on a case-
by-case basis. The OECD noted that in the context of a nexus based on significant economic 
presence, the implementation of a fractional apportionment would require: the definition of 
the tax base to be divided, the determination of the allocation keys to divide that tax base, 
and the weighting of these allocation keys, which would all be complicated to determine. The 
OECD noted that since the domestic laws of most countries use profit attribution methods 
based on the separate accounts of the PE, rather than fractional apportionment, 
consideration of the fractional apportionment method would not pursued further (OECD 
2015f: para. 287-288). 
 
(b)The modified deemed profit method: In the context of a nexus based on significant 
economic presence, the OECD notes that one possible approach would be to regard the 
presence to be equivalent to a physical presence from which the non-resident enterprise is 
operating a commercial business, and to determine the deemed net income by applying a 
ratio of presumed expenses to the non-resident enterprise’s revenue derived from 
transactions concluded with customers in the country (OECD 2015f: para. 290-91).  
 
3.3.3 General recommendations to prevent artificial avoidance of PE status 
 
Apart from addressing issues pertaining to abuse of PE status, tax administrations in Africa 
should take note that they will not be able to prevent the ensuing tax base erosion unless 
they are able to identify when a non-resident is conducting a business activity within their 
territory. African countries should have rules that ensure early detection of PEs and they 
should know how to react in order to tax economic activity carried on within the source state. 
In this regard, the UN recommends that developing countries could emulate India, which in 
2012 introduced annual reporting obligations for liaison offices to report activities of foreign 
entities and other entities of the same group operating in India. The UN recommends that 
developing countries should consider establishing this obligation with regard to foreign 
entities with a fixed place of business within their territory that claim the benefits of Article 
5(4) (UN 2015a: 404). The UN also recommends that countries could use the withholding tax 
mechanism for targeted sectors (such as construction and services) (UN 2015a: 404).For 
example, section 107(4) of Ghana’s Income Tax 896 of 2015 provides that a Ghanaian PE 
(which is treated as a separate entity from its owner) is required to withhold from tax any 
payment it makes just as a resident company would, and it is required to pay it over to the 
revenue authority. The UN also calls on developing countries to make use of the country-by-
country reporting mechanism under Action 13 of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS, which can 
be a risk-management tool for developing countries to find out if PEs have been created in 
their countries (OECD 2015a: 405). For African countries to benefit from country-by-country 
reporting, they should enact domestic legislation to enable this. For example, in South Africa, 
the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 was amended in 2015104 by the insertion in section 1 
                                                          
104  Amended by the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act 23 of 2015. 
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of the Act the definition ‘international tax standard’ to include country-by-country reporting as 
a standard for MNEs.  
 
4  General conclusion 
 
The discussion above has analysed how African countries can adopt the OECD’s measures 
to curtail BEPS with respect to Actions 4, 6 and 7. The measures will give countries the tools 
they need to ensure that profits are taxed where the economic activities generating the 
profits are performed and where value is created, while giving business greater certainty. 
The measures will apply once they are implemented, either in domestic laws or in the 
network of bilateral tax treaties. 
 
With respect to Action 4, Section 1 of this paper has discussed the best practices that the 
OECD recommends as more effective in limiting base erosion via interest deductions and 
other financial payments. The OECD hopes that such best practices will in future result in a 
convergence of national practices that could become minimum standards for countries to 
follow. As discussed in section 1, many African countries are already following certain 
approaches to limit base eroding interest deductions. Each country has to consider the pros 
and cons of its current approaches and evaluate its ability to implement the OECD’s 
recommended best practices in light of its administrative capability. African countries also 
have to ensure that they balance the need to protect their tax bases with the need to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI). For capital importing countries, very tight interest limitation 
rules may impact on the cost of borrowing for financing investments. 
 
With respect to Action 6 on preventing treaty abuse; the OECD recommends that countries 
adopt certain minimum standards, because lack of action by some countries would create 
negative spillovers on other countries. As discussed in Section 2 above, these minimum 
standards will result in certain changes to the OECD MTC. Since many African countries 
have signed treaties based on the OECD MTC, it would be in their interest to consider 
adopting the minimum standards intended to prevent treaty shopping in a comprehensive 
and coordinated manner. The OECD does acknowledge that some of its recommendations 
may not be appropriate for all countries (OECD 2015c: para. 21). Customised approaches 
may have to be adopted in some African countries whose administrative capacity may 
prevent them from applying complex anti-abuse rules like the LOB test, and require them to 
adopt more general anti-abuse provisions (for example the PPT rule).  
  
With respect to Action 7 on preventing the artificial avoidance of PE status, the OECD has 
produced guidelines to reinforce international tax standards which will result in changes to 
Article 5 of the OECD MTC. In order to ensure a coordinated international approach, African 
countries with treaties based on the OECD MTC will have to consider adopting the new 
international standards. It is however worth noting (as discussed in this paper) that Article 5 
of the UN MTC has other provisions that are advantageous to source countries, which are 
not covered in the BEPS recommendations. African countries will therefore have to consider 
if the OECD recommendations on PEs are sufficient to ensure that they collect their fair 
share of taxes from the activities of MNEs in their countries. It would be in the interests of 
African countries to ensure that they consider not only the BEPS recommendations but also 
aspects of the UN MTC when negotiating Article 5 in their tax treaties. Where there is no 
treaty in place, African countries should also consider the appropriateness of withholding 
taxes in exercising their taxing rights. 
 
Overall, protecting the tax base of African countries with respect to Actions 4, 6 and 7 will 
involve taking cognisance of the special needs and perspectives of the country in issue, such 
as the state of development of the tax system and its administrative capacity. It is advised 
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that ‘each country must evaluate its own situation to identify its particular issues and 
determine the most appropriate techniques to insure a sound tax base’ (UN 2013:33).  
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